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I. INTRODUCTION 
I have taught Sexuality and the Law for the past five years, and each year 
when I begin the marriage section in that course my students, who as 
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veterans of Constitutional Law are well versed in the right to marry cases, 
almost uniformly expect to read Loving v. Virginia.1 And why should I be 
surprised? That canonical marriage case struck down Virginia’s anti-
miscegenation statute—a marriage prohibition if there ever was one2—under 
the federal Constitution’s due process and equality guarantees. In so doing, 
the Loving Court observed that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been 
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit 
of happiness by free men,”3 and made a simple yet profound statement that 
lends itself so beautifully to the marriage equality controversy: that for the 
government to distribute the right to marry to some but not to all, “is surely 
to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.”4 
Indeed, coupled with the now routine tendency to draw analogies between 
race and sexual orientation, 5  as well as with the late Mildred Loving’s 
remarks that “all Americans, no matter their race, no matter their sex, no 
matter their sexual orientation, should have that same freedom to marry,”6 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Loving offers an invaluable way for any 
teacher, of law or otherwise, to initiate a robust conversation about marriage 
equality and about how official discrimination harms everyone, not just those 
who are most tangibly affected by it. 
All that being said, and despite the very good reasons for doing so, I do 
not begin the section on marriage equality in my course with Loving v. 
Virginia, even as I do exhaustively cover that foundational case throughout 
it. Rather, I rely on a more recent “Virginia” case to frame the conversation 
1 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
2 Unlike contemporary exclusionary marriage laws, which simply prohibit same-sex 
marriage, anti-miscegenation laws of the sort at issue in Loving v. Virginia both 
prohibited and criminalized interracial marriage. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 4–5 
(summarizing Virginia’s civil and criminal anti-miscegenation laws). 
3 Id. at 12.  
4 Id. (emphasis added).  
5 See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of 
Representation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 115, 115 (David 
Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998); Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 
UCLA L. REV. 1467, 1484–1503 (2000); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination 
Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 202 
(1994) (discussing the taboo against homosexuality and the taboo against miscegenation 
in analogous terms); Marc S. Spindelman, Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 N.C. L. 
REV. 359, 430–39 (2001) (discussing the race/sexual orientation analogy and its 
criticisms). 
6  See Mildred Loving, Loving for All: The 40th Anniversary of the Loving v. 
Virginia Announcement (June 12, 2007), available at http://www.freedomtomarry.org/ 
pdfs/mildred_loving-statement.pdf (remarks of Mildred Loving on the fortieth 
anniversary of Loving v. Virginia). 
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about marriage equality with my students. It is a case that, to my students’ 
initial puzzlement, did not involve a marriage prohibition (criminal or civil) 
at all. Nor, for that matter, did it involve governmental action that implicitly 
targets sexual minorities, as marriage prohibitions unarguably do.7  
Instead, that landmark case, United States v. Virginia, involved a form of 
sex (rather than sexual orientation) discrimination.8 I tell my students that it 
is well understood that Virginia is an unmistakeable part of the law’s sex 
equality canon, in large part because of the “ambitious” account of sex 
equality found in that decision’s majority opinion, authored by Justice 
Ginsburg 9 —for whom Virginia, according to some commentators, was a 
decision that “she had hoped the Court would one day arrive at when she first 
started arguing cases of [sex] discrimination in the 1960s.” 10  Far less 
understood, I continue, is how that foundational sex equality case might also 
constitute an integral part of the law’s sexuality equality canon, as it will in 
our class. I tell them, in short, that United States v. Virginia, no less than 
Loving v. Virginia, is, or at least should be, an indispensable part of any 
examination of what is considered by some to be the “‘gay civil rights’” issue 
of our time.11 
To be sure, on a superficial level, the issue in Virginia stands in an 
inverse relationship to that of marriage equality. The United States brought 
Virginia on behalf of those women who wanted the Virginia Military 
Institute (VMI), a state institution which categorically excluded women from 
7 See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885 (Iowa 2009) (“By purposefully 
placing civil marriage outside the realistic reach of gay and lesbian individuals, the ban 
on same-sex civil marriages differentiates implicitly on the basis of sexual orientation.”).  
8 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (holding that the categorical 
exclusion of women from a state military institute violated the federal Constitution’s 
Equal Protection Clause and that the state’s creation of a separate and unequal school for 
women failed to remedy that constitutional violation). 
9 Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term: Foreword: Leaving Things 
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 74 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Leaving Things 
Undecided] (calling Virginia an “ambitious opinion”); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE 
CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 165 (2001) [hereinafter 
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME] (“In several ways, United States v. Virginia was an 
ambitious, nonminimalist opinion.”). 
10 ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, SAME, DIFFERENT, EQUAL: RETHINKING SINGLE-SEX 
SCHOOLING 165 (2003) (remarks of Mark Tushnet, then Dean of the Georgetown 
University Law Center).  
11 See Keith Richburg, California Ruling Shows Hurdles Remain for Gay Marriage, 
WASH. POST, May 27, 2009, at A4 (quoting Evan Wolfson, executive director of 
Freedom to Marry), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/05/26/AR2009052600363 html. 
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admission since its founding in 1839,12 to become a mixed-sex institution. 
Gay rights organizations, by contrast, are currently bringing marriage 
equality cases throughout the United States on behalf of those individuals 
who want marriage to become a single-sex institution—in addition to 
remaining a cross-sex institution, of course. 
These differences aside, the VMI and marriage equality issues share 
more than they might appear to at first blush. First, they both concern 
institutions, VMI and marriage, respectively, the latter of which the law has 
long conceptualized in metaphorical terms as an “institution.”13 Second, just 
as the institution of VMI once did, the institution of marriage makes sex 
absolutely relevant, insofar as the question of which couples may enter into 
its privileged space depends entirely on what their legal sex is.14 Third, just 
as supporters of VMI’s single-sex requirement argued that VMI’s uniqueness 
would be destroyed were it to become mixed sex,15 so too do supporters of 
traditional marriage argue that marriage’s uniqueness will be destroyed were 
it to become single sex.16  
12 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 520. 
13 See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (“Marriage, as creating the 
most important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a 
people than any other institution, has always been subject to the control of the 
legislature.”). For a more recent example, see Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 
798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003) (referring to marriage as an “esteemed institution”). 
14 For the argument that exclusionary marriage laws constitute an impermissible 
form of sex discrimination, see, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 5, at 14. Only one court to 
date has agreed. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (finding that Hawaii’s 
opposite-sex marriage law constituted a presumptively unconstitutional form of sex 
discrimination under the state constitution and remanding the case to the lower court to 
apply heightened scrutiny to that law). 
15 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 540 (summarizing the Commonwealth’s claim that 
VMI’s unique program would be “destroy[ed]” were it forced to accommodate women as 
well as its claim that “[m]en would be deprived of the unique opportunity currently 
available to them” should women be admitted into VMI); United States v. Virginia, 766 
F. Supp. 1407, 1414 (W.D. Va. 1991) (“It has been established that if VMI were to admit 
women, . . . its uniqueness would be lost.”). 
16  For courts that have upheld exclusionary marriage laws on the ground that 
marriage is either “uniquely” male/female or a “unique” relationship whose traditional 
structure the state has a legitimate interest in preserving, see Milberger v. KBHL, LLC, 
486 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (D. Haw. 2007) (stating that “special attention to the ‘unique 
status’ of marriage underscores the need for additional caution when granting rights 
contingent upon marriage to unmarried partners”); In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
675, 726 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (citing In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 124, 145 (Bankr. W.D. 
Wash. 2004)); Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 732 N.W.2d 139, 150 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (“In Michigan, marriage is recognized as inherently a unique 
relationship between a man and a woman”) (quotations omitted); Lewis v. Harris, 875 
A.2d 259, 276 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (Parillo, J., concurring); Seymour v. 
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Still, more important than the structural and substantive continuities 
between the VMI and marriage equality issues is the reasoning that drives 
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Virginia, reasoning that might be, 
even if it thus far has not been, used as a lens through which to consider what 
sexual equality claims in the area of marriage might look like. More 
specifically, in the words of Professor Cass Sunstein, Justice Ginsburg’s 
“ambitious” 17  majority opinion in Virginia “offer[s] a particular 
understanding of sex equality,” 18  one that both acknowledges (indeed, 
celebrates) the reality of biological and social differences between the sexes 
and maintains that the government cannot rely on such differences to justify 
why it is constitutionally permissible to deny equal opportunity to members 
of either sex.19 Put most simply, Justice Ginsburg’s Virginia opinion makes 
more than clear that differences between the very individuals whom the 
government is treating differently need not defeat, nor be an impediment to, 
equality claims under the Constitution. 
Holcomb, 790 N.Y.S.2d 858, 864 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (stating that “the Legislature was [not] 
irrational in recognizing what is considered a unique and distinct social benefit derived 
from heterosexual marriage, to wit: natural procreation and child-rearing”); Andersen v. 
King County, 138 P.3d 963, 1002 (Wash. 2006). Uniqueness rationales have also driven 
exclusionary marriage amendments. Alabama’s amendment, for instance, which was 
passed in June 2006 by a wide margin of 81%, provides that “marriage [i]s ‘inherently a 
unique relationship between a man and a woman.’” Bailey v. Faulkner, 940 So. 2d 247, 
257 n.11 (Ala. 2006). Likewise, Michigan found that “[a]s a matter of public policy, this 
state has a special interest in encouraging, supporting, and protecting that unique 
relationship in order to promote, among other goals, the stability and welfare of society 
and its children.” Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 732 N.W.2d 139, 148 
n.8 (2007) (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 555.1 (2005)). Similarly, Protect Marriage 
Arizona, the organization responsible for Arizona’s (unsuccessful) same-sex marriage 
initiative in 2006, remarked that the “driving motive and purpose” behind that 
amendment was to “protect[] marriage by precluding redefinition of the term ‘marriage’ 
and by precluding marriage imitations that would undermine the unique status of 
marriage.” Response Brief of Real Party in Interest/Appellee at 4, Ariz. Together v. 
Brewer, 149 P.3d 742 (Ariz. 2007) (No. CV-06-0277-AP/EL). Even Massachusetts, prior 
to the Supreme Judicial Court’s opinion in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health 
striking down that jurisdiction’s cross-sex marriage limitation on state constitutional 
grounds, proposed an amendment in 2002 the text of which read: “It being the public 
policy of this Commonwealth to protect the unique relationship of marriage . . . only the 
union of one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in 
Massachusetts.” Opinion of the Justices to the Acting Governor, 780 N.E.2d 1232, 1233 
n.2 (Mass. 2002). 
17 SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 165; Sunstein, Leaving Things 
Undecided, supra note 9, at 74. 
18 SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 165. 
19 Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 9, at 76–77. 
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In ways and for reasons that this Essay will discuss in greater detail 
below, however, the rhetoric and the reasoning of marriage equality 
arguments tend to de-emphasize, rather than acknowledge, difference,20 be it 
the differences between gays and straights, between same-sex and cross-sex 
relationships, or between the families of gays and those of straights. Not only 
is this “no-differences” model, as this Essay will later refer to it, both 
descriptively inaccurate and normatively undesirable, it is also curious that 
advocates for marriage equality continue to rely so heavily on it in light of 
the fact that Justice Ginsburg’s celebration of difference reasoning from 
Virginia demonstrates that individuals need not be similarly situated to each 
other in all respects in order to receive equal treatment and equal opportunity 
by the government. While Virginia might be about educational, rather than 
marital, opportunity, and about gender, rather than sexual orientation, 
discrimination,21 it offers at least the foundation for a sexual and marriage 
equality jurisprudence, one that until now has had little, if any, room to 
flourish at least in part because of the kinds of arguments that gay advocates 
have made to courts in marriage equality litigation. For this reason, this 
Essay submits, United States v. Virginia, and Justice Ginsburg’s theory of 
sex equality found therein, should be an integral part of the marriage equality 
canon—no less so than the perhaps more immediately relevant Virginia 
marriage case that was decided nearly thirty years before it.  
This Essay will proceed as follows. Before considering the role that 
Virginia could play in shaping marriage equality arguments and marriage 
equality jurisprudence, Part II will first examine the no-differences paradigm 
that has informed the social, cultural, and legal understanding of same-sex 
marriage. To that end, it will provide examples of the way in which (1) the 
public has conceptualized gay marriage as but a same-sex version of its 
heterosexual counterpart and (2) advocates for marriage equality have tended 
to collapse same-sex relationships into their cross-sex counterparts for the 
purpose of securing an even-handed distribution of the right to marry by the 
government. Part III will then challenge, from a descriptive/factual 
20 By “marriage equality arguments” this Essay intends those arguments deployed 
by gay rights advocates on behalf of same-sex couple plaintiffs in marriage equality 
litigation. 
21 At least on its face, as one could argue that Virginia also implicates sexual 
orientation. For instance, one of the arguments that the Commonwealth put forth in 
support of its exclusionary policy was that VMI’s single-sex environment fulfilled one of 
the aims of single-sex colleges more generally, namely, to encourage students “to invest 
more energy in academic pursuits . . . because they have few opportunities to dissipate 
energy in courtship activities.” United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1435 (W.D. 
Va. 1991). Such a statement is predicated on the heterosexual presumption that 
“courtship activities” of any variety are not taking place in single-sex educational 
environments. 
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perspective, the no-differences model that has emerged from the legal, 
political, and social controversy over marriage for same-sex couples. More 
specifically, this Part will show that that model is descriptively inaccurate 
insofar as a number of studies of both same-sex couples and the families that 
they share suggest that myriad differences do indeed exist between those 
couples/families and their cross-sex counterparts, differences that the no-
differences model either woefully under-represents or completely distorts.  
Given the descriptive/factual shortcomings of the no-differences model, 
Part IV will suggest that advocates turn to a new model for 
sexuality/marriage equality advocacy, one that accepts, if not celebrates, 
perceptible differences even while arguing for equal treatment and equal 
opportunity. That model, this Part will argue, should look to the vision of 
difference on which Justice Ginsburg’s United States v. Virginia majority 
opinion in part rests. It will show that Justice Ginsburg’s “ambitious” vision 
of difference in Virginia, while largely absent from pro-marriage equality 
arguments, is by no means incompatible with the claim that exclusionary 
marriage laws violate constitutional equality guarantees. Moreover, this Part 
will address the possible reasons why marriage traditionalists have invoked 
Justice Ginsburg’s “inherent differences” passage 2  in support of 
exclusionary marriage laws, and will challenge their contention that the 
author of Virginia, based on her remarks with respect to inherent sex 
difference, would support such laws. Indeed, this Essay will submit that, if 
anything, Justice Ginsburg’s Virginia opinion should be deployed by 
marriage progressives in support of arguments why exclusionary marriage 
laws are unconstitutional, rather than the other way around. After setting 
forth the no-differences model in Part II, exposing its descriptive/factual 
shortcomings in Part III, and offering a new model for sexuality/marriage 
equality advocacy and jurisprudence in Part IV, this Essay will finally 
consider in Part V the normative value of turning to Justice Ginsburg’s 
celebration of difference in Virginia as a way to start thinking about the 
importance of difference in the areas of marriage equality and sexuality law 
more generally. 
II. MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND LIKE-STRAIGHT REASONING/THE NO-
DIFFERENCES MODEL 
In 1993, before the marriage equality movement was in full force, 
Professor Nancy Polikoff, a self-described “lesbian feminist,”23 commented 
22 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996). 
23 Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and 
Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every 
Marriage,” 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1993). 
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that the lesbian and gay community’s “desire to marry” represented “an 
attempt to mimic the worst of mainstream society.”24 Other left-leaning and 
progressive academics have echoed these sentiments, noting, for instance, 
that the marriage movement has tended to project an image of marriage that 
“replicates the heterosexual one, rather than challenging or altering it.”25  
Perhaps less surprisingly, this belief that marriage for same-sex partners 
amounts to a form of mimicry has been fully embraced by marriage 
traditionalists no less than it has been by those who would likely self-identify 
as progressive (albeit for very different reasons); 26  indeed, the rhetorical 
24 Id. 
25  Suzanna Danuta Walters, Wedding Bells and Baby Carriages: Heterosexuals 
Imagine Gay Families, Gay Families Imagine Themselves, in THE USES OF NARRATIVE: 
EXPLORATIONS IN SOCIOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND CULTURAL STUDIES 48, 54 (Molly 
Andrews et al. eds., 2004). For commentators who have considered the extent to which 
current pro-marriage equality rhetoric has come to echo or replicate conservative 
marriage idiom and the image of marriage that that idiom projects, see generally Lisa 
Duggan, The New Homonormativity: The Sexual Politics of Neoliberalism, in 
MATERIALIZING DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A REVITALIZED CULTURAL POLITICS 175, 187–88 
(Russ Castronovo & Dana D. Nelson eds., 2002) (stating that the neoliberal marriage 
rhetoric championed by Andrew Sullivan and others projects a “role for marriage” that 
“sound[s] an awful lot like the dangerous mixture of ‘moral education, psychotherapy 
and absolution”’ that has long marked conservative marriage idiom and criticizing 
Sullivan in particular for adopting a purely imitative conception of marriage as, in his 
words, the “‘mirror image of the happy heterosexuality I imagined around me”’); 
Courtney Megan Cahill, “If Sex Offenders Can Marry, Then Why Not Gays and 
Lesbians?”: An Essay on the Progressive Comparative Argument, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 777, 
777 (2007); Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236, 246–47 (2006) (stating that “enough of the arguments” 
recently deployed by same-sex marriage advocates “echo[] a longing for a kind of 
contemporary coverture, whereby one or both previously individuated subjects are 
dissolved into a joint legal and economic unit by and through the institution of 
marriage”). For an opposing view, see Mae Kuykendall, Resistance to Same-Sex 
Marriage as a Story About Language: Linguistic Failure and the Priority of a Living 
Language, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 390 (1999) (“Gay marriage speech is sincere 
and is not in any rigorous sense ‘mimicry’ of heterosexual marriage speech.”); Evan 
Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and 
the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 567, 587 (1994) 
(“What many gay people do not want is an all-or-nothing model imposed on their lesbian 
or gay identity; they want both to be gay and married, to be gay and part of the larger 
society. For these lesbians and gay men, being gay is not just about being different, it is 
also about being equal. Their deeply-held convictions about how they want to live their 
lives and liberation are not mere mimicry. They are entitled to respect within our 
community as well as by the state.” (citations omitted)). 
26  See generally Courtney Megan Cahill, The Genuine Article: A Subversive 
Economic Perspective on the Law’s Procreationist Vision of Marriage, 64 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 393, 416–23 (2007) (summarizing conservative counterfeiting rhetoric). 
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claim that marriage for sexual minorities represents a kind of fraud, 
counterfeit, or degraded imitation was so common in the political discourse 
surrounding marriage for gays and lesbians just a few years back that most 
people probably did not think all that much of it.27 As conservative author, 
columnist, and marriage equality opponent, Shelby Steele, remarked not too 
long ago: “[t]he true problem with gay marriage is that it consigns gays to a 
life of mimicry and pathos.”28 
Aside from the longstanding association between homosexuality and 
counterfeit, one that dates back at least to the thirteenth century and without a 
doubt to well before that,29 where did this idea that marriage for same-sex 
partners (and for gays and lesbians generally) represents a kind of mimicry or 
even parody come from? The following two sections address two possible 
reasons why marriage for same-sex couples has been conceptualized as a 
kind of mimicry by commentators from all walks of political and social life: 
first, the image of same-sex marriage that has been projected in the public 
domain by the news media sometimes looks like a same-sex replica of its 
heterosexual counterpart (or at least a replica of what the media imagines 
heterosexual marriage to look like); and second, the arguments that have 
been routinely deployed by gay advocates in marriage equality litigation, and 
embraced by some courts, almost uniformly follow what Professor Marc 
Spindelman has referred to as a “like-straight” reasoning, one that posits that 
gays deserve marriage because they are no different than their straight 
counterparts.30  Indeed, the image of same-sex marriage that has emerged 
from both the public imagining of it and the pro-marriage equality discourse 
about it partakes of a no-differences model, one that posits a one-to-one 
correspondence on nearly every level between gays and straights, between 
same-sex and cross-sex relationships, and between the families of gays and 
those of straights. 
27 See id. 
28 Shelby Steele, Selma to San Francisco?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2004, at A16. 
29 See Cahill, supra note 26, at 431–36 (discussing the historical antecedents of the 
contemporary claim that same-sex relationships are a counterfeit of the real thing). 
30  Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1365–66 
(2005) [hereinafter Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon] (summarizing the Goodridge 
court’s embrace of the like-straight argument that drove gay and lesbian advocates’ 
litigation strategy in that case); Marc Spindelman, Sodomy Politics in Lawrence v. Texas, 
JURIST, June 12, 2003, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=556724 [hereinafter 
Spindelman, Sodomy Politics] (summarizing the like-straight arguments that drove 
advocates’ litigation strategy in Lawrence v. Texas). 
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A. The Public Image of Gay Marriage (or the Ozzie and Ozzie 
Phenomenon) 
Last April, Benoit Denizet-Lewis wrote a feature article for The New 
York Times Magazine entitled Young Gay Rites, a piece whose principal 
objective was to answer the following question: Why had so many “[young] 
gay men” rushed to the altar, so to speak, in Massachusetts since Goodridge 
v. Department of Public Health was decided in 2003—700 to be exact—
when, as the old saw goes, most men, and indeed most young men, have to 
be dragged kicking and screaming to that symbolically fraught place? 31  
Moreover, what was it about the legal recognition of marriage for same-sex 
couples in Massachusetts that made that relationship so attractive and 
enticing not just to young men, defined by Denizet-Lewis as aged twenty-
nine and under, but to young gay men—a group that, unlike its 
stereotypically cohabitation-obsessed lesbian counterparts, is stereotypically 
averse to even a “second date?”32  Finally, in addition to exploring those 
interrelated questions, Young Gay Rites also aimed to capture how gay men 
in their twenties, for whom supposedly “no model for how to build a young 
gay marriage” existed, would “choose to construct and maintain their 
unions.” 33  “What would their marriages look like? And would the 
expectation of monogamy, a longstanding cornerstone of heterosexual 
marriage, be a requirement for their marriages as well?” Denizet-Lewis 
queried.34 
To answer these questions, Denizet-Lewis spent a few months “with a 
handful of young married and engaged gay couples,” an extremely limited 
sample, by his own admission, since “[a]ll were college-educated and 
white.”35 With respect to the article’s overarching question—why would so 
many gay, young, white, college-educated men in their twenties rush to the 
altar—Denizet-Lewis mostly tells his readers what that phenomenon, at least 
in his view, is not: either a political or social “reaction” to something 
(homophobia, for instance)36 or a “repudiation” of something (including “the 
31 Benoit Denizet-Lewis, Young Gay Rites, N.Y. TIMES, April 27, 2008, (Magazine), 
at 28. 
32  This is colloquially known as the “U-haul Syndrome, a long-joked-about 
tendency of lesbians to move in together on the second date.” Marcia Munson & Judith P. 
Stelboum, Introduction to THE LESBIAN POLYAMORY READER: OPEN RELATIONSHIPS, 
NON-MONOGAMY, AND CASUAL SEX, 1, 3 (Marcia Munson & Judith P. Stelboum eds., 
The Haworth Press, Inc. 1999). 
33 Denizet-Lewis, supra note 31, at 33. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 35. 
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gay world fashioned by previous generations of men—men who reacted to 
oppression and homophobia in the ’70s and ’80s by rejecting heterosexual 
norms and ‘values,’ particularly around sex and relationships”).37 Rather, as 
Denizet-Lewis relates, the featured couples appeared to be interested in 
marriage for many of the same reasons that heterosexual couples often are, 
namely, to formalize an emotional bond and “to communicate their love to 
each other.”38 
With respect to the other questions posed by Young Gay Rites—What 
will the model for those gay marriages be? What will they look like? And 
will “monogamy’s law”39 play as powerful (and repressive) a role in them as 
it has in their heterosexual counterparts?—Denizet-Lewis captures a range of 
intimate possibilities in the textual portion of his article. One couple, for 
instance, “vowed to be monogamous.”40 Another couple, by contrast, was 
quite candid about having an “open” relationship; in one of the spouse’s 
words, “We’re open to exploring our sexuality together in a way that makes 
us both comfortable.” 41  Indeed, and as reported by Denizet-Lewis, 
“[n]egotiating questions surrounding monogamy was a critical issue for most 
of the young married and engaged couples” whom he interviewed; in his 
words, “for several of the couples I spent time with[], there is no use 
pretending they aren’t attracted to other people.”42 In addition, none of the 
couples—again, at least in the textual portion of the article—fell into 
stereotypical “male/female” or “husband/wife” roles. Quite the contrary, 
“[m]ost of the couples insisted [that] they shared [domestic] responsibilities 
in ‘an egalitarian way.’”43 While one of the spouses “occasionally referred to 
himself as a ‘gay housewife,’”44 other “young gay married men bristled at 
the notion that they would fashion their domestic lives around heterosexual 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 34. Interestingly, something that Denizet-Lewis neglects to consider is that 
perhaps part of the reason why so many young gay men in Massachusetts are seeking to 
formalize, or have formalized, their relationships through marriage is because of the 
significant amount of privilege and status associated with that social structure, privilege 
and status with which the college-educated and “European American” cohort that was the 
exclusive focus of Denizet-Lewis’s study would very likely be acquainted. Denizet-
Lewis, supra note 31, at 33. 
39 Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsive Monogamy and Polyamorous 
Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 277 (2004).  
40 Denizet-Lewis, supra note 31, at 34. 
41 Id. at 35. 
42 Id. (emphasis added). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
954 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:4 
 
                                                                                                   
stereotypes” 45 —that old “canard” that in all same-sex relationships there 
must of necessity be a “man” and a “wife.”46  
What is most fascinating about Denizet-Lewis’s piece, however, is what 
appears not in the text of the article but rather in the photos that accompany 
it, photos that function simultaneously as an intriguing gloss on, and as a 
curious counterpoint to, Denizet-Lewis’s written words. Indeed, if one were 
to look just at the photos that attend Young Gay Rites, including The New 
York Times Magazine’s front cover photo for that issue, one would likely 
expect to read an article that is quite different in substance and in tenor from 
the one that Denizet-Lewis actually provides. Whereas Denizet-Lewis 
captures a range of possibilities when setting forth what gay marriage might 
look like—sometimes non-monogamous, sometimes monogamous, 
sometimes non-traditional, sometimes traditional—and whereas his subjects 
almost uniformly project an egalitarian image of marriage that is unburdened 
by conventional male/female or husband/wife roles, the photos themselves 
communicate a strikingly traditional and stereotypically heterosexual image 
of that institution. Moreover, whereas Denizet-Lewis provides a fairly 
realistic portrayal of marriage between young men, or at least between the 
privileged white young men that are featured in his article, the photos are 
decidedly idealistic and highly stylized throwbacks to the 1950s, or at least to 
what our culture might imagine a 1950s marriage to look like. 
For instance, all of the pictures, and most notably the cover photo, have 
an air of unreality about them; the subjects, which are stilted and manikin-
like, are staged in a tableau that looks more suburbia circa 1955 than it does 
contemporary Boston. The cover in particular features a characteristically 
“American” scene in saturated colors: the suburban summer barbeque. Two 
very handsome, white, and prototypically “American” men with slicked back 
hair, full smiles, khaki pants, and collared shirts are pictured barbequing over 
a table draped with a red and white-checkered tablecloth in the backyard of a 
house in the suburbs on a vibrant summer day. The only text on the cover 
page, aside from The New York Times Magazine logo, reads: “The 
Newlywed Gays!”47 
If it were not for the fact that the Denizet-Lewis article is not even 
remotely critical of the gay marriage movement that it identifies or of the 
45 Id. 
46 John Cloud, Are Gay Relationships Different?, TIME, Jan. 17, 2008, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1704660,00.html (“Researchers have 
long noted that because gender roles are less relevant in gay and lesbian relationships—
it’s a canard that in most gay couples, one partner plays wife—those relationships are 
often more equal than heterosexual marriages. Both guys do the dishes; both women grill 
the steaks.”). 
47 Denizet-Lewis, supra note 31, at cover. 
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couples whom it features, one would be inclined to think that the Times was 
engaging in satire by staging such a scene and by making such a 
proclamation. However, the article is not only uncritical of gay marriage, but 
also neutral with respect to the kinds of marital relationships that its subjects 
had either entered or were about to enter, even the more traditional same-sex 
marriages that tend to replicate what our culture often imagines heterosexual 
marriage to look like (i.e., male breadwinner and female homemaker). 
Moreover, and as a close friend recently reminded me, The New York Times, 
while left leaning, is not exactly The Onion. For that reason, it is highly 
unlikely that the photos were intended by the Times’s editors to function as 
an independent social/cultural/political indictment of, or as an ironic 
commentary on, either marriage between men or marriage as an institution. 
The photography that accompanies the article continues this leitmotif of 
1950s Ozzie and Harrietesque domestic bliss. Two of the four photos feature 
a white married couple, Joshua and Benjamin, the former of whom referred 
to himself in the article, perhaps only partially in jest, as a “gay 
housewife.”48 In each photo, Joshua assumes domestic roles stereotypically 
associated with women or wives, whereas Benjamin assumes domestic roles 
stereotypically associated with men or husbands. In the first photo, which 
appears on the first page of the article, Joshua is frolicking around the den 
with a vacuum cleaner, brimming with smiles and light on his feet in 
slippers, while his husband, Benjamin, throws him a smile from the leather 
chair in which he sits, legs crossed, reading a book at the end of a hard day, 
dog resting listlessly at his feet. 49  In the second photo, Joshua prepares 
dinner—perhaps according to the A Great American Cook cookbook that 
appears at the bottom of the frame—with a smile that is part sheepish, part 
“Look at what I did, honey!” while his husband, slightly taller, watches with 
a look of proud approval, his arm draped firmly around Joshua’s shoulder.50  
Of the other two photos that accompany the piece, one features an 
engaged couple, Marc and Vassili, in what appears to be a very traditional 
wedding photo, with one spouse standing and the other sitting in a chair even 
as both don tuxedos and boutonnieres.51 The other photo, an outlier of sorts 
in this tableau of (admittedly strained) domestic bliss, is of Aaron, a gay 
twenty-six-year-old recently divorced from another man. Curiously, the 
article itself portrays Aaron as a cheerful enough divorcee who has certainly 
moved on: Denizet-Lewis meets Aaron at a party that the latter attends with a 
48 Id. at 35.  
49 Id. at 28–29.  
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 31. 
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new boyfriend.52 The photo, however, depicts Aaron eating alone at a dining 
room table, blank-eyed and staring vacantly into space as he eats what 
appears to be a rather pathetic and paltry bowl of tomato soup.53 While on 
one level the photo of Aaron is quite unlike the other photos, on another level 
it is of a piece with them, as the misery of divorce portrayed in it is no less 
stylized than was the bliss of marriage that preceded it.  
Cognitive linguist, George Lakoff, might say that the visual tableaus of 
connubial bliss that go along with the Denizet-Lewis piece have the effect of 
“framing” the way that we conceptualize gay marriage.54 Under this view, 
visual media, no less than words, have the tremendous power not only of 
capturing how individuals might already think about marriage between same-
sex partners, but also of influencing and changing how they think about that 
relationship moving forward.55 Even though Denizet-Lewis offers a fairly 
nuanced portrayal of what a marriage between two young men might look 
like, the photos that accompany his piece both reflect and reproduce 
hackneyed stereotypes about marriage—and, interestingly enough, 
hackneyed stereotypes about heterosexual marriage rather than about gay 
marriage. Indeed, the visual imagery that the Times deploys to frame and 
represent marriage between men is striking for two reasons: first, because it 
evokes an image of marriage that no longer exists—if, indeed, it ever existed 
at all; and second, because it suggests that marriage between members of the 
same sex can only be conceptualized, and thereby understood, through a 
heterosexual lens, as something that is like traditional cross-sex marriage in 
all ways save for the fact that it is not, in fact, a cross-sex relationship. 
First, and as mentioned above, the imagery that accompanies Young Gay 
Rites is striking because it idealizes or romanticizes a time, the 1950s, that 
was not particularly hospitable to gays and lesbians (indeed, far from it).56 In 
52 Id. at 60. 
53 Denizet-Lewis, supra note 31, at 32.  
54 According to Lakoff, “[f]rames are the mental structures that allow human beings 
to understand reality—and sometimes to create what we take to be reality.” Moreover, 
frames “facilitate our most basic interactions with the world—they structure our ideas 
and concepts, they shape the way we reason, and they even impact how we perceive and 
how we act.” GEORGE LAKOFF, THINKING POINTS: COMMUNICATING OUR AMERICAN 
VALUES AND VISION 25 (2006) [hereinafter LAKOFF, THINKING POINTS]; see also GEORGE 
LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE: 
THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR PROGRESSIVES (2004); GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS 
(2002). 
55 See LAKOFF, THINKING POINTS, supra note 54, at 26. 
56 See, e.g., JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING 
OF A HOMOSEXUALITY MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1940–1970 40 (1983) 
(summarizing how “[t]he Cold War and its attendant domestic anticommunism provided 
the setting in which a sustained attack upon homosexuals and lesbians took place”); 




                                                                                                   
a letter to the editor, for instance, one reader of the article expressed her 
disbelief that the Times chose a 1950s leitmotif for a piece about 
contemporary marriage for sexual minorities when history had clearly shown 
that the 1950s were not “especially welcoming to gays and lesbians.” 57  
Moreover, the imagery idealizes or romanticizes a time which, according to 
some historians, never truly existed according to that idealized or 
romanticized vision in the first place.  
For instance, historian of the family, Professor Stephanie Coontz, has 
argued that “[l]ike most visions of a ‘golden age,’ the ‘traditional 
family’ . . . evaporates on closer examination. It is an ahistorical amalgam of 
structures, values, and behaviors that never coexisted in the same time and 
place.”58  With respect to the whitewashed image of the 1950s family in 
particular, Coontz writes: “The happy, homogeneous families that we 
‘remember’ from the 1950s were . . . partly a result of the media’s denial of 
diversity.”59 Moreover, “[t]he reality of these families was far more painful 
and complex than the situation-comedy reruns or the expurgated memories of 
the nostalgic would suggest.” 60  “Contrary to popular opinion,” she 
continues, “‘Leave it to Beaver’ was not a documentary.”61 To be sure, the 
Times’s invocation of a 1950s family form is especially perplexing 
considering that homosexuality was thought to pose a threat to that very form 
at that very time, as 1950s political rhetoric routinely linked together 
homosexuality, “deviant family or sexual behavior,” sedi
munism.62  
Second, and more pertinent here, the imagery that accompanies Young 
Gay Rites is striking because it strongly suggests that marriage between 
same-sex partners (or at least between two men) is naturally viewed through 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 
(1998); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion, 
Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 
YALE L.J. 2411, 2424–25 (1997) (discussing the “antihomosexual Kulturkampf of the 
1950s”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudence and the Apartheid of the 
Closet, 1946–1961, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 703, 708 (1997). 
57 Letters, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2008, (Magazine), at 6. 
58 STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE 
NOSTALGIA TRAP 9 (1992). 
59 Id. at 31. 
60 Id. at 29. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 33; see also D’EMILIO, supra note 56, at 41 (“As the anticommunist wave in 
American politics rose, it carried homosexuals with it.”); see also id. at 43 (stating that 
“[t]he homosexual menace continued as a theme of American political culture throughout 
the McCarthy era” and that “[r]ight-wing organizations combined their attacks on 
communists with calls for the ejection of homosexuals from government”). 
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an idealized and romanticized heterosexual lens. As described above, the 
cover photo depicts two men having a summer barbecue. Not only is the 
family barbecue an iconic image of the 1950s heterosexual family,63  but 
barbecuing itself has long been considered to be one of those things that the 
man of the house—and, in particular, the heterosexual man of the house—
uniquely does. Several commentators, for instance, have noted that “there is 
a masculine overtone to the [barbecue] grill” 64  and that barbecuing falls 
within the “prototypically male realm,” one that also includes “car repairs” 
and “sports.” 65  Moreover, Professor Melissa Murray, who has recently 
provided a nuanced and thorough interpretation of the “Yes on 8” 
movement’s media strategy in California prior to the passage of Proposition 
8, 66  observes that one of the “Yes on 8” television advertisements 
predictably concluded with a “post-election barbecue,” one where Tom, the 
heterosexual husband character, “man[ned] the grill” (no pun likely 
intended). 67  Along with the iconic barbecue, Murray observes, the ads 
invoked other familiar images that dealt with traditional gender roles within 
marriage;68 their collective objective, she argues, was to “appeal[ ] to gender 
traditionalists with subtle visual cues.”69 Fascinatingly, then, the image of 
marriage that opens up an article whose aim, in part, is to investigate just 
what marriage between two men will look like70  replicates the image of 
marriage that concludes an ad whose aim, in part, is to present to the public 
                                                                                              
63 See COONTZ, supra note 58, at 31 (stating that “suburban ranch houses and family 
barbecues were the carrots offered to white middle class families that adopted the new 
norm
t Do You Call Two Straight Men Having 
Dinn
2005) (stating that the barbecue has been “traditionally associated with the male 
role”
ghts: Parents, the State, and 
Prop . J. C.R. & C.L. (forthcoming 2009). 
6.  
iage, be a 
requ enizet-Lewis, supra note 31, at 33. 
s” of the 1950s). 
64 See Jennifer Lee, The Man Date: Wha
er?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2005, § 9, at 2. 
65  Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of 
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1211 (1990); see also 
Nancy D. Polikoff, Lesbian and Gay Parenting: The Last Thirty Years, 66 MONT. L. REV. 
51, 60 (
). 
66 Melissa Murray, Marriage Rights and Parental Ri
osition 8, 5 STAN
67 Id. at 25–2
68 Id. at 26. 
69 Id. at 24. 
70 At the outset of Young Gay Rites, Denizet-Lewis queries: “What would [the] 
marriages [between the young gay men whom he interviewed] look like? And would the 
expectation of monogamy, a longstanding cornerstone of heterosexual marr
irement for their marriages as well?” D




article and what the Times was attempting to capture in the photography that 
acco
as had 
the great joy to preside over many gay unions in New Jersey, I was 
dangers of abandoning the traditional, and traditionally gendered, 
definition of marriage.71  
As noted above, the 1950s-style barbecue that frames “Young Gay Rites” 
is just one of the many stereotypically gendered images that appear in that 
article. It is probably no surprise, then, that for some readers there was a 
troubling disjuncture between what Denizet-Lewis was actually saying in
mpanied it. In the words of the same reader who was quoted above: 
I enjoyed Denizet-Lewis’s article. He created a lively and sympathetic read, 
chronicling the path to marriage and beyond, a path that is not so different 
for couples of any sexual orientation. But why the colorized, exaggerated 
photos, mimicking the most clichéd and self-conscious of coupled 
moments? Why pose Marc and Vassili in tuxedos when they specifically 
stated that they will sidestep all the trappings associated with ‘traditional’ 
weddings? Besides the uncomfortable nod to the ’50s (an era that was not 
especially welcoming to gays and lesbians), it suggests that gay couples are 
somehow ‘play acting’ at being married. As a civil celebrant, who h
offended by the way these couples were depicted, at least visually.72 
To add to this reader’s already incisive remarks—remarks that echo 
those of progressive commentators who have faulted the marriage equality 
movement for projecting an image of marriage that “replicates the 
heterosexual one, rather than challenging or altering it”73—one wonders why 
the Times never included a photo of the “two Brandons,” the two engaged 
young men whose story occupied a sizeable chunk of the article and who 
evaded the trappings of tradition more than any of the other couples featured 
in Young Gay Rites. That is, among the couples whom Denizet-Lewis 
interviewed for that piece, the Brandons were the most willing to embrace 
the prospect of non-monogamy 74  and the quickest to recognize the 
“heteronormative” aspects of “traditional . . . married culture.”75 Perhaps it is 
for precisely those reasons that the Brandons had no role in the photography 
that accompanied the Denizet-Lewis article, photography that was insistent 
on transposing a(n idealistic) model of heterosexual marriage onto gay 
marriage, on viewing marriage between two men through an exclusively 
heterosexual lens, and on adhering to a no-differences model that 
                                                                                                   
71 See Murray, supra note 66, at 26. 
72 Letters, supra note 57, at 6. 
73 See Danuta Walters, supra note 25, at 54. 
74 Denizet-Lewis, supra note 31, at 34. 
75 Id. 
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xual paradigm. 76  Interestingly, and as the next 
Section will now discuss in greater detail, this no-differences model has 
than it has visual renderings of that relationship in such leading media outlets 
as The New York Times. 
s litigation is clear upon a survey of the arguments that have been 
dep
has driven the arguments that gay rights organizations have made in litigation 
dea
conceptualizes marriage between same-sex partners as but a same-sex 
version of its cross-sex counterpart. While beyond the scope of this Essay, it 
is worth mentioning that The New York Times Magazine’s pictorial treatment 
of alternative family structures exhibits a pattern of adhering to this no-
differences model; the cover photo for an earlier feature article in the 
Magazine, which considered how gays and lesbians have families of their 
own, also represents the family of two lesbians, two gay men, and the 
children that one of the women had with one of the men as one that 
approximates a heterose
influenced legal arguments in the movement in favor of gay marriage no less 
B. Gay Advocacy and Like-Straight Reasoning/The No-Differences 
Model 
The domestic/marital tableaus that accompany a high profile piece such 
as Young Gay Rites vividly and visually mirror a larger phenomenon in the 
marriage equality movement, namely, the tendency to rely on a litigation 
strategy that posits that same-sex couples, and the families that they share, 
are just like cross-sex couples in all ways with respect to the right to marry. 
Professor Marc Spindelman has referred to this line of argumentation as 
“like-straight” reasoning, defined in greater detail below, and has 
demonstrated the extent to which that sort of reasoning has driven gay rights 
litigation strategies across a range of substantive areas, from the sexual 
autonomy cases (Lawrence v. Texas) 77  to the marriage equality cases 
(Goodridge v. Department of Public Health).78 That like-straight reasoning, 
or the invocation of a no-differences model, has become a stock feature of 
gay right
loyed in that litigation. In addition, it is no surprise that like-straight/no-
differences arguments are such a familiar feature of gay rights litigation, as 
they make a great deal of sense for a number of doctrinal and strategic 
reasons. 
Before considering those reasons, however, it is first useful to define 
like-straight reasoning/the no-differences model and to survey in brief how it 
ling with substantive areas such as sexual autonomy and marriage for 
                                                                                                   
76 John Bowe, Gay Donor or Gay Dad?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2006, (Magazine), at 
66–67. 
77 Spindelman, Sodomy Politics, supra note 30, at 2. 
78 See Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, supra note 30, at 1365. 





same-sex partners. Spindelman, who criticizes like-straight arguments largely 
for reasons other than those suggested here, 79  defines those arguments 
simply as the claim that “[l]esbians and gay men are just like 
heterosexuals.”80 For that reason, the argument goes, “lesbians and gay men 
deserve the same rights and privileges heterosexuals receive, including the 
right to marry, and for just the same reasons.”81 Under this view, sameness 
between gays and straights is a necessary precondition for equal or 
symmetrical legal treatment; like-straight logic, in other words, “reinforc[es] 
the abstract logic that to be equal one must be the same”82 (the same logic, it 
turns out, and as Part IV will show, that Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion 
in Virginia at least partially disrupts vis-à-vis sex equality). Both 
“seductively simple”83 and “remarkably uncomplicated,”84 the proposition 
that gays are just like heterosexuals and should therefore be treated t
delman observes, is a nice way to “unite” the independent doctrinal 
claims that advocates for gay rights commonly deploy in gay rights 
                                                                                                   
79 For instance, Spindelman has argued that like-straight reasoning, which rests on 
“formal equality logic,” grants “rights only on the terms that the socially privileged [i.e., 
heterosexuals] have set . . . . As legal theorist Catharine MacKinnon has observed: 
concealed in this approach ‘is the substantive way in which man has become the measure 
of all things.’ And this man has, substantively, been heterosexual.” Sodomy Politics, 
supra note 30, at 3. In addition, like-straight arguments “reinforc[e] the abstract logic that 
to be equal one must be the same.” Id. Most problematic for Spindelman, however, is the 
power of like-straight arguments (1) to “embrace and advance the idea that 
heterosexuality (at least at its core) is all good, all happy,” when, in fact, “[a]s feminism 
has shown, the institution of heterosexuality has hardly been so egalitarian,” id., and (2) 
to elide the reality of sexual violence in cross-sex and same-sex relationships alike. Like-
straight reasoning, under this view, tends to “regard any victory for sex as sweet, even 
when the sex that prevails is (or includes) sexual viol[ence].” Id. at 5. See also 
Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, supra note 30, at 1375 (stating that the like- 
strai usetts’ opinion in 
Goo licitude for 
marr d the wa atively structured and defined”). 
0, at 1365. 
ian and gay plaintiffs in Goodridge argued for 
ght reasoning that drove the Supreme Judicial Court of Massach
v. Department of Public Health exhibited an “uncritical sodridge 
e aniag y it has been heteronorm
80 Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, supra note 3
81 Id. 
82 Spindelman, Sodomy Politics, supra note 30, at 3.  
83 Id. at 2. 
84 Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, supra note 30, at 1365.  
85 See Spindelman, Sodomy Politics, supra note 30, at 2 (stating that attorneys in 
Lawrence v. Texas made both privacy and equality claims in that case, and that “what 
unite[d] these . . . claims . . . [was] a seductively simple proposition: gays are just like 
heterosexuals”); Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, supra note 30, at 1365 (stating 
that “[f]ollowing a pattern visible and (at last) successful in other recent lesbian and gays 
rights litigation efforts, lawyers for the lesb
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e Law Professors’ Brief that was 
filed in Lawrence highlighted what in its view was a multitude of similarities 
betw
xuals 
are just like heterosexuals and, consequently, deserve all the same rights 
                                                                                                   
Even just a brief survey of the sorts of arguments that were made to the 
United States Supreme Court in Lawrence, and that have been made to 
various state supreme courts in marriage equality litigation, reveals how 
widespread like-straight reasoning/the no-differences model really is. For 
instance, and as Spindelman points out, th
een gays and straights. In his words:  
Just in case anyone (or anyone who happens to sit on the Supreme Court) 
should be unaware of the breezy similarities between homosexuals and 
heterosexuals, the Law Professors’ Brief details some of the ways that “gay 
people,” just like heterosexuals, “form couples and create families that 
engage in the full range of everyday activities, from the most mundane to 
the most profound.” Gay people, for example, “shop, cook, and eat 
together.” Who knew? They “celebrate the holidays together, and share one 
another’s families.” And they even “make financial and medical decisions 
for one another[,]” and “rely on each other for companionship and support.” 
In sum, “[m]any gay couples share ‘the duties and the satisfactions of a 
common home.’” In these and other ways, the Law Professors’ Brief 
affirms, as do many other gay rights briefs in Lawrence, that homose
and privileges that heterosexuals have. Guess what: We’re human.86  
Similarly, the briefs that have been filed by advocates in gay rights 
litigation, and particularly in marriage equality litigation, overwhelmingly 
have adopted like-straight reasoning/the no-differences model. For instance, 
advocates have argued that “[s]ame-sex committed relationships deserve to 
be honored with the same rights and responsibilities that are granted to 
heterosexual couples,”87 that “just as heterosexual relationships arise from 
existing social and religious practices, so too do the relationships 
of . . . same-sex couples . . . who are responsible, contributing members of 
their communities,”88 and that “lesbian and gay couples often have stable, 
committed, and enduring relationships that play the same central role in their 
same-s marriage rights on both liberty and equality grounds. Broadly uniting these 
form plicated proposition: Lesbians 
and 
Amici Curiae Human Rights Campaign et al. in Support of Plaintiffs-
App
spondents’ Answer to Amici Curiae Briefs at 23, Woo v. California, 49 Cal. 
Rptr
ex 
ally distinct doctrinal claims was a remarkably uncom
gay men are just like heterosexuals”). 
86 Spindelman, Sodomy Politics, supra note 30, at 3. 
87 Brief of 
ellants at 6, Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (No. A-
002244-O3T5). 
88 Re
. 3d 675 (Ct. App. 2006) (No. A110451) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 





and state constitutional equality guarantees rest. According to that principle 
and its antecedent philoso
lives as they do for heterosexuals.”89 More recently, and in response to the 
traditionalist marriage argument that same-sex couples can be denied the 
right to marry because same-sex, or “genderless,” marriage is a sub-optimal 
environment in which to have and raise children, 90  gay advocates have 
argued that lesbian and gay couples “can provide stable family environments 
just as heterosexuals can,”91 that “children raised by gay and lesbian parents 
are as likely to be well-adjusted as children raised by heterosexu
ents,” 92  and that “[n]umerous studies of children raised by gay and 
lesbian parents conducted over the past 25 years . . . show that children raised 
by lesbian and gay parents are as successful as children raised by 
heterosexual parents.”93 
As mentioned above, the deployment of like-straight arguments in gay 
rights advocacy, whether in the area of sexual autonomy or that of marriage, 
makes sense on both a doctrinal and a strategic level. First, like-straight 
reasoning, or the no-differences model, makes sense from a doctrinal 
perspective in part because of the formal equality principle on which
phical tradition, similarly-situated individuals, and 
like cases, must be treated alike.94 To do otherwise, of course, would be to 
violate those federal and/or state constitutional equality guarantees.  
                                                                                                   
89 Appellants’ Abstract, Brief, and Addendum at 429, Dep’t of Human Servs. v. 
Howard, 238 S.W.3d (Ark. 2006) (No. 05-814). 
90 For the use of the term “genderless marriage” to refer to a marriage between 
members of the same sex, see Monte Neil Stewart, Genderless Marriage, Institutional 
Realities, and Judicial Elision, 1 DUKE J. OF CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 4–6, 20–24 
(200 . L. 11, 
85–9
onsidering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State Interests in 
Mar ARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 771, 799–802 (2001); Lynn D. 
War
6); Monte Neil Stewart, Judicial Redefinition of Marriage, 21 CAN. J. FAM
5 (2004). For additional arguments that marriage should be exclusively cross-sex for 
reasons relating to both procreation and child development, see Lynn D. Wardle, 
“Multi ly and Replenish”: Cp
riage Procreation, 24 H
dle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 833.  
91 Appellants’ Abstract, Brief, and Addendum, supra note 89, at 429–30.  
92 Final Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 40, Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 
(Iowa 2008) (No. 07-1499).  
93 Id. at 40 n.33.  
94 See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) (“[The Equal Protection 
Clause] embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases alike but may treat 
unlike cases accordingly.”); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 
439 (1985) (“The Equal Protection Clause ... is essentially a direction that all persons 
similarly situated should be treated alike.”). The ‘like-cases should be treated alike’ idea 
derives from Aristotle’s discussion of justice in the Nicomachean Ethics. THE ETHICS OF 
ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book V, 1131a25 (J.A.K. Thomson trans., 
1976). For a discussion of the law’s implementation of the formal equality principle, see 
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Unsurprisingly, those who oppose extending marriage rights to same-sex 
couples have tried to argue that, in their view, exclusionary marriage laws do 
not violate constitutional equality guarantees precisely because same-sex 
couples are dissimilarly situated from cross-sex couples in all sorts of 
relevant ways when it comes to marriage, including the ways that the former 
both have and raise children. For instance, in California’s marriage equality 
case, In re Marriage Cases,95 one defendant made an unsuccessful threshold 
argument that the California constitution’s equality guarantees did not even 
apply to the state’s cross-sex marriage restriction because “same-sex couples 
and opposite-sex couples are not ‘similarly situated’ with regard to the 
challenged statute’s legitimate purpose.” 96  Similarly, in Iowa’s recent 
marriage equality case, Varnum v. Brien,97 the government tried to argue, 
again unsuccessfully, that the “[same-sex couple] plaintiffs are not similarly 
situated to opposite-sex couples so as to necessitate further equal protection 
analysis because the plaintiffs cannot ‘procreate naturally.’”98  
Whether marriage equality opponents argue that equal protection does 
not even apply because same-sex and cross-sex couples are so differently 
situated, or that the differences between same-sex and cross-sex couples in 
areas such as procreation and the family serve as legitimate reasons for 
differential treatment, the idea is the same: it does not violate constitutional 
equality guarantees to prohibit same-sex couples from marrying each other 
because they are different from those who already do enjoy that right. In light 
of the formal equality principle that underlies constitutional guarantees of 
equal protection, then, and in light of marriage traditionalists’ attempt to 
rebut the application of that principle to marriage prohibitions, it makes 
perfect doctrinal sense that marriage equality advocates would want to 
emphasize just how similarly situated same-sex couples are to their cross-sex 
                                                                                                   
generally Robin West, The Missing Jurisprudence of the Legislated Constitution, in THE 
CONSTITUTION IN 2020 79, 84 (Balkin & Siegel eds., 2009) (“Formal equality is the 
jurisprudential ideal at the heart of the meaning of adjudicative law. Treating likes alike 
is what judges do when they are doing their jobs morally and doing them well.”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 745 (1993) (describing 
analogical reasoning as a situation where “[t]he law treats A in a certain way” and 
“[b]ecause B shares certain characteristics with A, the law should treat B the same way”); 
Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 
341, 344 (1949); Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1 
(1974). 
95 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5, as recognized in, Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 
364 (2009). 
96 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 435 n.54 (summarizing this argument). 
97 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
98 Id. at 882. 
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cou
 the fourth factor, 
the 
                                                                                                   
nterparts when it comes to marriage. The more advocates can convince 
courts that the former are just like the latter, at least when it comes to such 
things as marriage and the family, the more likely those courts will find that 
marriage prohibitions violate constitutional equality guarantees and the 
equality principle on which they rest.  
In addition, gay advocates’ invocation of a no-differences model also 
makes doctrinal sense from the perspective of determining which level of 
review should apply to marriage restrictions in the first instance. A 
significant issue to be litigated before state supreme courts in marriage 
equality litigation has been which level of judicial review should apply to 
marriage restrictions that are being subject to state constitutional equal 
protection challenges. Predictably, in those cases marriage equality advocates 
have argued that heightened scrutiny should apply to those restrictions 
because gays and lesbians constitute a suspect class and because sexual 
orientation constitutes a suspect classification. 99  To make that argument, 
advocates have variously reasoned that gays and lesbians (1) have been 
subject to a history of discrimination, (2) have immutable characteristics, (3) 
have been (or are) politically powerless, and (4) are being discriminated on 
the basis of a trait, sexual orientation, that bears no relationship to a person’s 
ability to perform or contribute to society. With respect to
United States Supreme Court has explained that whether a characteristic 
is irrelevant to a person’s ability to contribute to society should be used by 
courts when determining, for equal protection purposes, whether any given 
characteristic is suspect/quasi-suspect or non-suspect. The more irrelevant a 
characteristic is, the more suspect it is, and vice versa.100  
99 See, e.g., Memorandum of Authorities in Support of All Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Support of All Plaintiffs’ Resistance to Defendant’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment at 57–63, Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (No. 
CV5965) [hereinafter Memorandum of Authorities]; Respondents’ Opening Brief on the 
Merits at 26–39, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (No. S147999). Of 
course, advocates have also argued in the alternative that even if sexual orientation does 
not constitute a suspect class, exclusionary marriage laws are still unconstitutional 
because they fail to satisfy even rational basis review. See, e.g., Memorandum of 
Authorities at 76 (“Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their equal protection 
and due process claims . . . even if rational basis review applies.”). 
100 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) 
(stating that race, national origin, and alienage “are so seldom relevant to the 
achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are 
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy”); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686–
87 (1973) (stating that because “the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to 
ability to perform or contribute to society . . . statutory distinctions between the sexes 
often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal 
status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members”). 
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 distinctions exist between gays and straights when it 
com
“just as heterosexual persons 
do.”
other,” existed for constitutional purposes.102  
                      
In light of the is-the-classification-irrelevant factor for determining its 
status under constitutional equality guarantees, it is of little surprise that 
marriage equality advocates have minimized any possible differences 
between the sexual majority and the sexual minority. Indeed, it would seem 
that advocates would have to downplay any differences whatsoever, good 
and bad alike, between the sexual majority and the sexual minority in order 
to make the best possible case that gays and lesbians are a suspect class 
insofar as their sexual orientation never matters, that is, never affects how 
they contribute to society, whether that contribution be positive or negative. 
In other words, it is not only that marriage prohibitions are unconstitutional 
because no legitimate
es to marriage and the family. It is also that equal protection doctrine 
more generally compels advocates to argue that one’s minority sexual 
orientation status, like one’s race and gender status, should never be relevant. 
The less relevant that a trait is, the less likely that the government will be 
able to classify on the basis of it without running afoul of constitutional 
equality protections.  
Second, and relatedly, like-straight reasoning makes strategic sense 
because it has enjoyed success in the courts, some of which have struck 
down legislation that burdens sexual minorities by invoking the equal 
protection principle, by downplaying the distinctiveness (and thereby the 
relevance) of one’s sexual minority status, and by adverting to the no-
differences model. The Lawrence v. Texas majority, for instance, relied on a 
kind of like-straight reasoning when it stated that “[p]ersons in a homosexual 
relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes”—“purposes,” the prior 
paragraph suggests, “relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, child rearing, and education”—
101 The proposition that gays are just like heterosexuals when it comes to 
sexual, reproductive, and even perhaps marital autonomy was one that the 
Bowers v. Hardwick majority roundly dismissed as preposterous seventeen 
years earlier, when it emphasized that “[n]o connection between family, 
marriage, or procreation, on the one hand, and homosexual activity, on the 
                                                                             
hose obvious public goods to which they were being likened.” 
(foo
101 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (emphasis added).  
102  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986); see also Spindelman, 
Homosexuality’s Horizon, supra note 30, at 1375–76 (stating that in Bowers, “Justice 
Byron White deemed ‘facetious’ the suggestion that same-sex sexual intimacies deserved 
protection on a par with decisions involving marriage, family, and procreation. From his 
perspective, the differential treatment made perfect sense: Same-sex sexual intimacies 
bore no relation to t
tnotes omitted)). 
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that has built into it the idea that 
lesb
ight Iowans were when it came to 
mar
raising families, just like heterosexual couples,”111 that “official recognition 
                                                                                                   
Just a few months after Lawrence was decided, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts wholeheartedly embraced the no-differences model 
in Goodridge, in which a bare majority of the court ruled that Massachusetts’ 
cross-sex marriage definition violated state constitutional liberty and equality 
guarantees.103  As Spindelman observes, “‘[l]ike-straight’ reasoning drives 
Marshall’s Goodridge opinion start to end,” 104  as the majority there 
champions “a definition of marriage 
ians and gay men, hence their relations, are just like heterosexuals, and 
theirs.” 105  “Exchanging the classic definition’s presumption that 
heterosexuality and homosexuality are unalike for one that implicitly negates 
it,” he continues, “Goodridge declares the institution of marriage is 
fundamentally about relationships.”106  
Most recently, in Varnum, the Iowa Supreme Court consistently relied on 
like-straight reasoning when explaining why that state’s cross-sex marriage 
definition violated state constitutional equality guarantees. 107  At the very 
beginning of its unanimous opinion, for example, the court made clear just 
how similarly situated gay and stra
riage, stating, “[l]ike most Iowans, they are responsible, caring, and 
productive individuals . . . . Like many Iowans, some have children and 
others hope to have children . . . . Like all Iowans, they prize their liberties 
and live within the borders of this state with the expectation that their rights 
will be maintained and protected.”108  
The remainder of the Varnum court’s opinion continues this like-
straight/no-differences theme. In response to the argument that gays could be 
denied the right to marry because they allegedly make sub-optimal parents, 
for instance, the court reasoned that “[m]any leading 
organizations, . . . supported the conclusion that gay and lesbian parents are 
as effective as heterosexual parents in raising children”109 and that “[l]esbian 
and gay parents are as likely as heterosexual parents to provide supportive 
and healthy environments for children.”110  Moreover, the court variously 
observed that “[p]laintiffs are in committed and loving relationships, many 
 2003). 
 Homosexuality’s Horizon, supra note 30, at 1366. 
t 1367. 
.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009). 
ded). 
ded). 




107 See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W
108 Id. at 872 (emphasis added). 
109 Id. at 874 (emphasis ad
110 Id. (emphasis added). 
111 Id. at 883 (emphasis ad
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rnum court agreed with the 
plaintiffs that sexual orientation constituted something more than a non-
minority sexual orientation status—was not relevant to one’s ability to 
con
se families, whether biological or 
not.
ex couples and their families are different in some rather important 
way
of their status provides an institutional basis for defining their fundamental 
relational rights and responsibilities, just as it does for heterosexual 
couples,”112 and that “for purposes of Iowa’s marriage laws, . . . plaintiffs are 
similarly situated in every important respect [to heterosexual couples], but 
for their sexual orientation.”113 Finally, the Va
suspect class, given that sexual orientation—and, in particular, one’s 
tribute to society in any distinctive way.114  
C. Moving Beyond Like-Straight Reasoning/The No-Differences Model  
Simply because like-straight reasoning/the no-differences model makes 
sense on a doctrinal and strategic level, however, does not necessarily mean 
that it is either descriptively accurate or normatively desirable. To be sure, it 
is of course true that gays are like straights in many significant ways that 
merit both exposure in the public realm (in prominent media outlets such as 
The New York Times) and serious consideration by courts. Many gays, like 
many straights, want to enter into long-term, committed relationships. Many 
gays, like many straights, want to structure those relationships according to 
conventional roles, with one breadwinner and one homemaker. Many gays, 
like many straights, desire to have and to rai
 And many gays, like many straights, want the protections of the law—
protections that, unfortunately, are largely available only to those who 
choose to seek legal recognition of their relationship in the form of marital, 
domestic partnership, or civil union status. 
The point here, however, is that neither gays, nor the intimate 
relationships that they form with each other, are just like straights and their 
intimate relationships—just like them in all the ways that visual media and 
litigation arguments suggest that they are. Moreover, and from a more 
normative standpoint, gay advocates should not have to argue that same-sex 
relationships are just like their cross-sex counterparts in all significant ways 
when it comes to marriage and the family in order to secure an even-handed 
distribution of the right to marry, especially when studies suggest that many 
same-s
s from many cross-sex couples and their families. 115  Cognizable 
                                                                                                   
112 Id. (emphasis added). 
113 Varnum, 763 N.W.2d. at 883–84 (emphasis added). 
114 Id. at 890–93. The Varnum court applied the four factors set forth above and 
found that sexual orientation constituted a quasi-suspect classification deserving of 
heightened judicial review. See id. at 896. 
115 See infra discussion at Part III. 
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onal challenge. That model, as 
mentioned earlier, is Justice Ginsburg’s United States v. Virginia majority 
opinion as the 
fact that such d  a model, this 
Essay will suggest, on which a new sexuality/marriage equality advocacy and 
juri
sex couples across a range of 
area
Biblarz. 116  In that study, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents 
     
differences, this Essay submits, need not defeat equality claims, even as they 
have taken a backseat to a no-differences model and its strict formal equality 
logic. 
While not inherently bad, the ideas that gays are just like straights or that 
same-sex couples are just like cross-sex couples that are expressed in both 
visual depictions of same-sex marriage and legal arguments made to courts 
are woefully incomplete and therefore warrants reconsideration. As the next 
Part will show, abundant research suggests that significant differences 
between gay and straight relationships exist, differences that get downplayed 
in marriage equality litigation out of a fear that the mere admission of any 
difference between same-sex and cross-sex couples would signal the death 
knell to a constitutional challenge of an exclusionary marriage law for the 
reasons suggested above. Moreover, not only do empirical studies exist that 
suggest that same-sex and cross-sex relationships are different in important 
ways that go unmentioned, but so too does a legal model for incorporating 
the reality of that difference into a constituti
, one that boldly recognizes the reality of difference as well 
ifference cannot justify unequal treatment. It is
sprudence could, and indeed should, rest. 
III. THE DESCRIPTIVE SHORTCOMINGS OF LIKE-STRAIGHT 
REASONING/THE NO-DIFFERENCES MODEL 
Even though the no-differences model has shaped the way in which the 
public sometimes views same-sex marriage as well as the way in which gay 
advocates routinely cast their arguments in marriage equality litigation, a 
wealth of sociological and psychological research exists that casts doubt on 
that model. These studies, which thus far have not made their way into pro-
marriage equality briefs for reasons offered below, suggest that significant 
differences exist between same-sex and cross-
s, from interpersonal interactions to parenting, the latter of which, as 
discussed earlier, has played a prominent role in arguments against marriage 
equality. Insofar as these studies acknowledge difference on myriad levels, 
they pose a serious challenge to the progressive no-differences model and to 
the narrow vision of equality that it produces.  
Perhaps the most controversial study to date disputing the no-differences 
model was published in 2001 by sociologists Judith Stacey and Timothy 
                                                                                              
116 Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of 
Pare  AM. SOC. REV. 159 (2001). nts Matter?, 66
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tively as their 
stra
nificance of any findings of differences,” the 
auth
were published over a seventeen-year period, from 1981 to 1998.125 After 
                                                                                                   
Matter?, Professors Stacey and Biblarz challenge what they refer to as the 
“‘no differences’ doctrine” that has come to dominate comparative research 
on lesbian and gay family issues.117 The authors explain that most empirical 
research on lesbian and gay family life that is sympathetic to it takes a 
“defensive” stance by aiming to debunk the conservative myth that sexual 
minorities make bad parents and/or do not parent as effec
ight counterparts.118 For that reason, they continue, the objective of most 
pro-gay comparative empirical work in this area has been to show that 
lesbian and gay parents are just like heterosexual parents and that lesbian and 
gay parenting is no different from heterosexual parenting.119  
In Stacey and Biblarz’s view, such “defensive” pro-gay research not only 
adheres to a “heterosexis[t]” and “hierarchical model,” one that “implies that 
differences indicate deficits,” but also “hampers research and analysis among 
those who explicitly support lesbigay parenthood” because it fails to 
investigate “whether (and how) differences in adult sexual orientation might 
lead to meaningful differences in how individuals parent and how their 
children develop.”120  Indeed, this tendency “to tread gingerly around the 
terrain of differences,” they argue, “compromises the development of 
knowledge not only in child development and psychology, but also within 
the sociology of sexuality, gender, and family more broadly.” 121  “When 
researchers downplay the sig
ors conclude, “they forfeit a unique opportunity to take full advantage of 
the ‘natural laboratory’ that the advent of lesbigay-parent families provides 
for exploring the effects and acquisition of gender and sexual identity, 
ideology, and behavior.”122  
In this article, then, Stacey and Biblarz propose a different approach, one 
that represents a progressive “[r]ethinking [of] the ‘no differences’ doctrine” 
that has shaped pro-gay family research; 123  in their words, theirs is an 
“alternative strategy that moves beyond hetero-normativity without forfeiting 
the fruitful potential of comparative research.”124 To that end, the authors 
meticulously re-examine twenty-one studies of lesbian and gay parenting that 
t 163. 
t 162. 





121 Id.  
122 Stace
123 Id. at 163.  
124 Id.  
125 See id. at 167. 
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eful scrutiny of the 
find
                                                                                                   
doing so, Stacey and Biblarz confirm what both they and a handful of other 
researchers had suspected, namely, that critical differences between straight 
and lesbian/gay parenting exist.126 Whereas those studies, Stacey and Biblarz 
tell us, “almost uniformly claim to find no differences in measures of 
parenting or child outcomes,”127 their meta-analysis of those same studies’ 
findings suggests otherwise. As they put it: “[O]ur car
ings [the previous studies] report suggests that on some 
dimensions . . . the sexual orientations of these parents matter somewhat 
more for their children than the researchers claimed.”128 
More specifically, after revisiting the previous studies, Stacey and 
Biblarz argue that they support the conclusion that differences between 
lesbian/gay and straight parenting exist in three key areas: gender, sexuality, 
and parenting practices.129 First, the authors posit that the sexual orientation 
of parents can have an influence on the gender identity of children, 
particularly if those parents are lesbians (or, if one parent, a lesbian).130 For 
instance, Stacey and Biblarz report that according to one study children of 
lesbian mothers (or of a lesbian mother) “more frequently dress, play, and 
behave in ways that do not conform to sex-typed cultural norms.” 131  
Daughters of lesbian mothers “reported higher aspirations to nontraditional 
gender occupations,” with “53 percent . . . of the daughters of lesbians 
aspir[ing] to careers such as doctor, lawyer, engineer, and astronaut, 
compared with only 21 percent . . . of the daughters of heterosexual 
mothers.”132 Similarly, “[o]n some measures, like aggressiveness and play 
preferences, the sons of lesbian mothers behave in less traditionally 
126  Id.
harlotte J. Patterson, 
Chil . 1025 (1992).  
ey & Biblarz, supra note 116, at 167.  
t 168. 
 at 176. For other studies, see Gillian A. Dunne, What Difference Does 
“Difference” Make? Lesbian Experience of Work and Family Life, in RELATING 
INTIMACIES 189 (Julie Seymour & Paul Bagguley eds., 1999); G. Dorsey Green & 
Frederick W. Bozett, Lesbian Mothers and Gay Fathers, in HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 197 (John C. Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds., 
1991); Charlotte J. Patterson, Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children, in THE LIVES 
OF LESBIANS, GAYS, AND BISEXUALS: CHILDREN TO ADULTS 274 (Ritch C. Savin-
Williams & Kenneth M. Cohen eds., 1996); Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of the 
Lesbian Baby Boom: Behavioral Adjustment, Self-Concepts, and Sex Role Identity, in 
LESBIAN AND GAY PSYCHOLOGY: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND CLINICAL APPLICATIONS 156 
(B. Greene & G.M. Herek eds., 1994); Celia Kitzinger & Adrian Coyle, Lesbian and Gay 
Couples: Speaking of Difference, 8 THE PSYCHOLOGIST 64 (1995); C
dren of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD DEV
127 Stac
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 167. 
130 Id. a
131 Id. 
132 Id. (citation omitted). 
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d behavior.” 134  “Such findings raise provocative questions 
abo
137 Similarly, another 
stud
n their heterosexual counterparts (i.e., 
heterosexual mothers and fathers). 142  They contend that the comparative 
        
masculine ways than those raised by heterosexual single mothers.”133 In the 
authors’ view, the studies suggest that “the sexual orientation of mothers 
interacts with the gender of children in complex ways to influence gender 
preferences an
ut how children assimilate gender culture and interests,” they continue, 
“questions that the propensity to downplay differences deters scholars from 
exploring.”135 
Second, and more controversially, Stacey and Biblarz maintain that the 
studies support the claim that parents’ sexual orientation can have an effect 
on the sexuality of children.136 For instance, the authors report that one study 
of gay fathers and their adult sons provides “evidence of a moderate degree 
of parent-to-child transmission of sexual orientation.”
y suggests that “young adults reared by lesbian mothers 
were . . . significantly more likely to report having thought they might 
experience homoerotic attraction or relationships.”138 
Third, Stacey and Biblarz contend that the studies support the conclusion 
that differences exist with respect to the parenting practices of straight and 
lesbian parents. 139  For instance, “[c]hildren of lesbian mothers . . . report 
feeling more able than children of heterosexual parents to discuss their sexual 
development with their mothers and . . . their mothers’ partners.” 140  In 
addition, lesbian mothers who conceived through donor insemination (DI) 
“scored significantly higher than the DI heterosexual fathers on measures of 
parenting skills, practices, and quality of interactions with children.”141 In 
fact, in Stacey and Biblarz’s view, the studies suggest that “lesbian co-
parents may enjoy greater parental compatibility and achieve particularly 
high quality parenting skills” tha
                                                                                           
133 Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 116, at 168. 
134 Id. at 170. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. For an opposing view, see Carlos A. Ball, Lesbian and Gay Families: Gender 
Nonconformity and the Implications of Difference, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 691, 702 (2003) 
(“I do not believe . . . that we are anywhere near a minimum threshold of plausibility for 
Stacey’s and Biblarz’s . . . conclusion that parents influence the sexual orientation of their 
children.”). 
137 Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 116, at 171. 
138 Id. at 170. 
139 Id. at 174. 
140 Id. at 175. 
141 Id. at 174. 
142 Id. 




d communication between 
parents and children. The genesis of this pattern cannot be understood on 
sex
                                                                                                   
ngths of lesbian co-parents have something to do with both gender a
al orientation. In their words:  
[S]exual orientation and gender should be viewed as interacting to create 
new kinds of family structures and processes—such as an egalitarian 
division of child care—that have fascinating consequences . . . for child 
development . . . . Some of the evidence suggests that two women co-
parenting may create a synergistic pattern that brings more egalitarian, 
compatible, shared parenting and time spent with children, greater 
understanding of children, and closeness an
the basis of either sexual orientation or gender alone. Such findings raise 
fruitful comparative questions for future research about family dynamics 
among two parents of the same or different gender who do or do not share 
similar attitudes, values, and behaviors.143 
Stacey and Biblarz ultimately conclude not only that “modest and 
interesting” differences exist between straight and lesbian/gay parents,144 but 
also that “the effects of parental gender trump those of sexual orientation,” 
insofar as the research indicates that “children with two same-gender parents, 
and particularly with co-mother parents, should develop in less gender-
stereotypical ways than would children with two heterosexual parents.”145 
As to the differences, the authors comment that, far from operating as 
“deficits,” they either “favor the children with lesbigay parents, . . . or 
represent ‘just a difference’ of the sort democratic societies should respect 
and protect.”146 They conclude their study by “recogniz[ing] the political 
dangers”147 of pointing out differences between straight and gay parenting, 
and, in particular, of noting the possible relevance of a parent’s sexual 
orientation on the development of his or her child’s/children’s own 
uality.148 Nevertheless, they remark, “[i]t is neither intellectually honest 
nor politically wise to base a claim for justice on grounds that may prove 
falsifiable empirically . . . . [T]he case for granting equal rights to 
nonheterosexual parents should not require finding their children to be 
identical to those reared by heterosexuals.”149  
143 Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 116, at 175 (citations omitted). 
144 Id. at 176. 
145 Id. at 177. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 178. 
148 Id. 
149 Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 116, at 178 (emphasis added). 
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o the 
stereotype that same-sex relationships are less stable and more volatile than 
their cross-sex counterparts, Gottman and Levenson found that gay and 
     
Since Stacey and Biblarz’s paper on the differences between straight and 
gay parenting was published in 2001, social scientists have published a 
number of other studies that suggest that significant differences exist 
between straight and gay parenting as well as straight and gay relationships 
more generally.150 A New York Times Magazine article published just this 
past November, for instance, cites to recent studies that highlight the 
differences between straight and gay parenting, differences which, those 
studies contend, account for the fact that children raised by gays and lesbians 
are “more tolerant,” among other things, than those raised by straight 
parents. 151  Indeed, the author of that article remarks that “[i]t is 
striking . . . how comparatively rarely children are mentioned as an argument 
in favor of gay marriage,”152 as studies show that gay parenting tends to 
promote equality in parenting, the latter of which might “also be better 
for . . . children.”153 
Similarly, in 2003, renowned couples therapist, John Gottman, along 
with Berkeley psychology professor, Robert Levenson, published two 
longitudinal observational studies—the first of their kind—that tracked 
partner interactions in gay and lesbian relationships. 154  Contrary t
                                                                                              
150 While some studies of the differences between gay and straight relationships pre-
existed that of Stacey and Biblarz, the vast number of them have been published since 
2001. For prior studies, see Lawrence A. Kurdek, Relationship Outcomes and Their 
Predictors: Longitudinal Evidence From Heterosexual Married, Gay Cohabiting, and 
Lesbian Cohabiting Couples, 60 J. OF MARRIAGE & FAM. 553 (1998) [hereinafter 
Relationship Outcomes]; Lawrence A. Kurdek & J. Patrick Schmitt, Relationship Quality 
of Partners in Heterosexual Married, Heterosexual Cohabiting, and Gay and Lesbian 
Rela
ND GAY PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN: RESEARCH 
ON T
pra note 151, at 9 (emphasis added). 
 Conflict Interaction, 45 J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY 65 (2003) [hereinafter 
Obse
tionships, 51 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 711 (1986). 
151  See Lisa Belkin, What’s Good for the Kids, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2009, 
(Magazine), at 9, 11. Belkin alerts her audience to recent academic studies that 
investigate the similarities as well as the differences between gay and straight parenting. 
Id. at 9. Those studies include a recent book on the subject by Professor Abbie Goldberg. 
See ABBIE E. GOLDBERG, LESBIAN A
HE FAMILY LIFE CYCLE (2009). 
152 Belkin, su
153 Id. at 11. 
154  John Mordechai Gottman et al., Correlates of Gay and Lesbian Couples’ 
Relationship Satisfaction and Relationship Dissolution, 45 J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY 23 
(2003) [hereinafter Correlates]; John Mordechai Gottman & Robert Wayne Levenson, 
Observing Gay, Lesbian and Heterosexual Couples’ Relationships: Mathematical 
Modeling on
rving]. 
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lesb
er in the positive 
affe
 have to do with the standard status hierarchy between men 
and
longitudinal (although not observational) research on gay, lesbian, and 
heterosexual married couples, 163  has concluded that lesbian/gay couples 
     
ian relationships were not just “fundamentally different from 
heterosexual relationships,” but also healthier in many key respects.155 
For instance, compared to heterosexual couples, gay/lesbian couples 
were more “upbeat in the face of conflict,”156 using “more affection and 
humor when they bring up a disagreement.” 157  Moreover, gay/lesbian 
couples “use[d] fewer controlling, hostile emotional tactics” than their 
heterosexual counterparts, displaying “less belligerence, domineering and 
fear with each other than straight couples do.” 158  Finally, “homosexual 
couples were more positive in their influence on the partn
ct ranges and less negative in their influence on the partner in the 
negative affect ranges than were heterosexual couples.”159 
Based on these and other observations, Gottman and Levenson conclude 
that, far from confirming the stereotype of gay/lesbian instability, the studies 
show that “heterosexual relationships may have a great deal to learn from 
homosexual relationships.”160 The authors suggest that at least part of the 
reason why the gay and lesbian committed relationships that they observed 
would “differ so much from heterosexual couples” is because same-sex 
couples “value equality far more than [do] heterosexual couples.”161 “The 
greater negativity and lowered positivity of heterosexual couples,” they 
conclude, “may
 women, a pattern that research has shown is largely absent in same-sex 
couples.”162  
Other studies support Gottman and Levenson’s conclusions that 
lesbian/gay relationships appear to be stronger and less hierarchical in many 
key respects than their heterosexual counterparts. For instance, Professor 
Lawrence Kurdek, one of the first scientists to conduct sophisticated 
                                                                                              
155 Gottman & Levenson, Observing, supra note 154, at 84.  
156  The Gottman Institute, 12-Year Study of Gay & Lesbian Couples, 
http: bian (summarizing the findings from 
the s); see also Gottman & Levenson, 
Obse
., Observing, supra note 154, at 87.  
 (2004) [hereinafter Are Gay and 
//www.gottman.com/research/projects/gayles
Homosexuality’s observational studieJournal of 
g, supra rvin note 151, at 84–88.  
157 The Gottman Institute, supra note 156.  
158 Id. 
159 Gottman et al
160  Id.
161 Id. at 87–88. 
162 Id. at 88. 
163 See Kurdek, Relationship Outcomes, supra note 150; see also Lawrence A. 
Kurdeck, Are Gay and Lesbian Cohabiting Couples Really Different From Heterosexual 
Married Couples?, 66 J. OF MARRIAGE & FAM. 880
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“reported higher levels of private self-consciousness, openness, and comfort 
with closeness” than straight couples.164 Moreover, “[c]ompared to married 
[heterosexual] partners,” Kurdek found, “lesbian relationships reported more 
intimacy, more autonomy, [and] more equality.”165  
More recent research likewise suggests that lesbian and gay couples are 
“more egalitarian than heterosexual couples” when it comes to the division of 
labor in the household; 166  as one study reports, “being in a same-sex 
relationship is more important in equalizing housework than is having similar 
incomes.” 167  “In this regard,” the authors of that report state, “same-sex 
couples are a model for ways of equalizing the division of housework.”168 
Furthermore, as also observed by Gottman and Levenson, researchers have 
found that “same-sex couples engage in relationship maintenance behaviors 
in more egalitarian ways.” 169  This “more egalitarian approach taken by 
same-sex couples,” one researcher comments, “is an advantage that could 
benefit straight couples too.”170  
                                                                                                   
Lesbian Cohabiting Couples]; Lawrence A. Kurdek, Differences Between Heterosexual-
Nonparent Couples and Gay, Lesbian, and Heterosexual-Parent Couples, 22 J. F . OF AM  
ISSUES 728 (2001) [hereinafter Differences Between]. 
164 Kurdek, Differences Between, supra note 163, at 747. 
165 Gottman & Levenson, Observing, supra note 154, at 67 (summarizing Kurdek’s 
findings). 
166  Sondra E. Solomon, Esther D. Rothblum & Kimberly F. Balsam, Money, 
Housework, Sex, and Conflict: Same-Sex Couples in Civil Unions, Those Not in Civil 
Unions, and Heterosexual Married Siblings, 52 SEX ROLES 561, 572 (2005); see also 
Malley Shechory & Riva Ziv, Relationships Between Gender Role Attitudes, Role 
Division, and Perception of Equity Among Heterosexual, Gay and Lesbian Couples, 56 
SEX ROLES 629, 635 (2007) (“As hypothesized, it was found that same-sex couples had 
more liberal attitudes toward gender roles than heterosexual couples did . . . [W]e found 
lesbian couples to be more egalitarian than heterosexual couples regarding the household 
tasks.”). 
167 Solomon et al., supra note 166, at 572; see also Shechory & Ziv, supra note 163, 
at 636 (“Our results confirm those of Solomon et al. (2005), who found that sexual 
orientation for both women and men were [sic] a stronger predictor of division of 
household tasks than was income difference.”).  
168 Solomon et al., supra note 166, at 572; see also Lisa Belkin, When Mom and 
Dad Share It All, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2008, (Magazine), at 74 (discussing studies which 
have found that, as compared to heterosexual couples, “[l]esbian couples . . . have a more 
equal division of housework”).  
169 Solomon et al. supra note 166, at 573. 
170  Same-Sex Couples More Likely To Have Satisfying Marital and Family 
Relations, THAINDIAN NEWS, Jan. 13, 2008, http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/health/ 
same-sex-couples-more-likely-to-have-satisfying-marital-and-family-relations_10012659 
html (Jan. 13, 2008) (paraphrasing Robert-Jay Green, executive director of the Rockway 
Institute). 
2009] CELEBRATING DIFFERENCES 977 
 
 quite prominent 
and
pro
                               
Based on the empirical studies surveyed above, from those that study 
how the sexual orientation of parents matters when it comes to raising 
children to those that examine how labor is divided in a same-sex household, 
one would expect to find the following sorts of arguments in marriage 
equality briefs: “While same-sex couples might be like cross-sex couples 
when it comes to the desire to marry, in some critical respects research 
suggests that they are different from cross-sex couples when it comes to 
structuring the division of household and parenting labor in a committed 
relationship. One researcher, for instance, has suggested that, as compared to 
cross-sex couples, ‘same-sex couples are a model for ways of equalizing the 
division of housework.’”171 Or: “It is unconstitutional to withhold the right 
to marry from same-sex couples on the basis that cross-sex couples make 
better parents because research suggests that, if anything, the perceptible 
differences that do exist between lesbian/gay and straight parenting ‘favor 
the children’ with lesbian/gay parents.”172 Or finally: “Some
 renowned scientists have argued that ‘heterosexual relationships may 
have a great deal to learn from homosexual relationships.’173 As such, same-
sex marriage could serve an important educative function.” 
To be sure, this is not at all to suggest that hierarchical, unequal, and 
even abusive same-sex relationships do not exist. Indeed, and as Spindelman 
has cogently argued, like-straight arguments are problematic not only 
because they collapse same-sex relationships into cross-sex relationships, but 
also because they elide the sexual violence that exists in gay and straight 
communities alike. 174  It is to suggest, though, that like-straight rhetoric 
foundly under-represents the realities of gay relationships—whether it is 
the reality of same-sex sexual violence (as Spindelman argues) or the reality 
of difference between gays, straights, and the families, if any, that they raise.  
While the empirical studies surveyed here certainly do not negate the 
possibility of inequality and violence within same-sex relationships, they do 
present a portrait of those relationships that is largely absent in gay rights 
litigation (and, as The New York Times Magazine photo montage suggests, in 
mainstream media portrayals of gay marriage as well). As discussed in Part 
II, any acknowledgement of difference between same-sex and cross-sex 
couples is missing in pro-marriage equality briefs—briefs which, predictably 
                                                                    
phasis added). 
nd would keep 
them den from public view.”). 
171 Solomon et al., supra note 166, at 572 (em
172 Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 116, at 177. 
173 Gottman et al., Observing, supra note 154, at 87. 
174 Spindelman, Sodomy Politics, supra note 30, at 6 (“The tightlipped silence in the 
gay rights Lawrence briefs around the current realities of same-sex sexual violence within 
the gay community keeps them exactly where male supremacy does a
 among heterosexuals: invisible, hid
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enough, largely do not cite to the aforementioned studies.175  Indeed, the 
dominant paradigm in both the public representation of g
uments put forward by advocates in favor of that institution is one of no-
differences. That being the case, it is not surprising that gay advocates would 
shy away from empirical studies that suggest otherwise.  
With respect to progressive commentators’ reception of the Stacey-
Biblarz study in particular, Professor Clifford Rosky has recently observed 
that “[i]n law review articles, legal scholars have generally downplayed the 
article’s finding that there were ‘differences’ between the children of gay and 
lesbian parents and the children of heterosexual parents.” 176  In fact, he 
reports, “[t]hey do not acknowledge that the authors found significant 
differences in children’s gender and sexual development at all.”177 To the 
extent that the Stacey-Biblarz study is cited in pro-marriage equality briefs, it 
appears almost exclusively to support the propositions that “[e]mpirical 
research over the past two decades has failed to find any meaningful 
differences in the parenting ability of lesbian and gay parents compared to 
heterosexual parents”178 and that “scientific research has consistently shown 
that the children of gay parents are no different from other
ect to their development.”179 As one might expect, the differences that 
Stacey and Biblarz did uncover are highlighted and embraced instead by 
those who oppose marriage equality for sexual minorities.180  
Moreover, because the social, cultural, and legal understanding of gay 
marriage has been so deeply informed by this no-differences paradigm, the 
benefits or advantages of same-sex relationships—their egalitarianism, for 
instance—go unnoticed. Recall here the two images of the “gay housewife,” 
Joshua, and his husband, Benjamin, from The New York Times Magazine 
arenthood, and the 
Gen omophobia, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 257, 336 (2009). 
Association at 38, Andersen v. 
King
ys, Inc. et 
al. a
stody, visitation, adoption, or marriage rights.” 
Rosk
175 See supra discussion at Part II. 
176 Clifford J. Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, P
der of H
177 Id. 
178 Amicus Curiae Brief of American Psychological 
 County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (No. 75934-1). 
179 Brief of Amici Curiae Parents, Families & Friends of Lesbians and Ga
t 18, Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (Nos. 6589 & 6599). 
180 See, e.g., Brief of Family Research Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Defendants-Appellants at 33, Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007) (No. 44) (“In 
reality, the same-sex parenting studies show a significant difference in outcome between 
children raised by heterosexual mothers and those raised by lesbians. Stacey and Biblarz, 
themselves proponents of same-sex parenting, challenge the intellectual honesty of the 
reports of ‘no differences.’”). Rosky also notes that marriage “[o]pponents like [Lynn] 
Wardle have welcomed [their] article, which they cite as conclusive proof that gay men 
and lesbians should not be granted cu
y, supra note 176, at 336.  
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piece on gay marriage in Massachusetts. 181  Each photo depicted a 
conventional gendered division of labor in the household, with Joshua 
cooking and vacuuming (i.e., performing what culture perceives to be 
women’s work) and with Benjamin reading and looking on (i.e., doing what 
culture perceives to be those things that the man of the house does). 182  
Because these images were so closely tethered to heterosexual norms—or, at 
least, to what culture imagines those norms to be—and to a no-differences 
model, they failed to capture not only what is distinctive about many same-
sex relationships, but also what research suggests is their unique value, 
including their tendency to promote an egalitarian work ethic at home. While 
Joshua and Benjamin might have chosen to structure the division of labor in 
their household in this way, studies suggest that many same-sex couples do 
not (recall Denizet-Lewis’s observation that many of his subjects “bristled at 
tereotypes” 183 ). The no-differences paradigm, then, profoundly
nts reality, and quite possibly distorts it.  
. TOWARD A NEW VISION OF SEXUAL EQUALITY: UNITED STATES V. 
VIRGINIA AND THE CELEBRATION OF DIFFERENCE 
A serious reconsideration of the no-differences model that has shaped the 
social, cultural, and legal understanding of same-sex marriage is warranted 
for two reasons: first, because that model, as Part III has explained, is 
woefully incomplete; and second, because a model of equality that 
incorporates difference, as Part V will argue, is normatively desirable. This 
Part will put forward such a model, one that embraces, rather than rejects, 
difference, as well as one that understands that differences might enhance, 
rather than defeat, equality claims. That model, which the author hopes will 
be one on which a vision of sexual equality might one day rest, will be ba
ignificant part on Justice Ginsburg’s United States v. Virginia majority 
opinion, one that recognizes the value of difference even as it rejects the 
state’s attempt to deny individuals equal opportunity on account of it.184  
To that end, Sections A and B will review Justice Ginsburg’s majority 
opinion in Virginia and the “distinctive understanding of sex equality” that 
emerges from it.185 Section C will then consider the surprisingly limited role 
that Virginia has played in pro-marriage equality briefs and the much more 
181 Denizet-Lewis, supra note 31, at 29. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 35.  
184 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
185 Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 9, at 74. 
980 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:4 
 
s opposing marriage equality for same-sex partners. Finally, 
Section D will make the case for incorporating Virginia into sexual/marriage 
lity 
jurisprudence. 
bstantially related to the important state interest of achieving 
edu
                                                                                                   
pronounced role that Justice Ginsburg’s celebrated “differences” passage has 
played in brief
equality advocacy and perhaps eventually into a sexual/marriage equa
A. United States v. Virginia: Justice Ginsburg’s Majority Opinion 
The issue before the Court in United States v. Virginia was whether it 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution categorically to exclude women from the Virginia 
Military Institute (VMI), an all-male state military college and the only 
public educational institution in Virginia to discriminate on the basis of 
sex.186 At trial, the Commonwealth advanced several sex- or gender-related 
reasons why VMI was unsuitable to women. In particular, the 
Commonwealth maintained that both “gender-based physiological 
differences” 187  and “gender-based developmental differences” 188  existed 
between men and women that would make it difficult, if not impossible, for 
members of the latter group to satisfy the rigorous physical, psychological, 
and emotional demands of VMI’s adversative method, the training protocol 
that rendered VMI “distinctive” 189  in a way that contributed to the 
Commonwealth’s overall “objective of educational diversity.”190 Women, in 
the Commonwealth’s view, were so physically, psychologically, and socially 
different from men that to admit them into VMI would be to change the very 
thing that made the school unique.191 In turn, because VMI’s uniqueness 
would be lost were it to admit women, the Commonwealth argued, it 
followed that the school’s exclusionary policy satisfied intermediate scrutiny, 
as it was su
cational diversity—the educational diversity, that is, that a unique school 
like VMI represented within the educational system of the Commonwealth as 
a whole.192  
186 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550.  
187 United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1432 (W.D. Va. 1991). 
188 Id. at 1434.  
189 Id. at 1413.  
190 Id.  
191 Id. at 1414. 
192  Id. at 1413 (“I find that both VMI’s single-sex status and its distinctive 
educational method represent legitimate contributions to diversity in the Virginia higher 
education system, and that excluding women is substantially related to this mission.”). 




ions for denying women admission 




                                                                                                   
In its initial judgment, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s 
ruling on the ground that the Commonwealth failed to advance “any state 
policy by which it can justify its determination, under an announced policy of 
[educational] diversity, to afford VMI’s unique type of program to men and 
not to women.”193 Moreover, the appeals court remanded the case to the 
district court to compel the Commonwealth “to formulate, adopt, and 
implement a plan” that conformed “with the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”194 In a final judgment, the Fourth Circuit agreed 
with the district court that the “plan” that the Commonwealth later devised—
opening up a “parallel” institution for women at another school (which 
turned out to be patently unequal) rather than 
stitutional. 195  Both sides appealed to the Supreme Court, the 
Commonwealth on the ground that its gender exclusionary policy did not 
violate, and the United States on the ground that the Commonwealth’s 
remedy did violate, the Equal Protection Clause.196  
In a landmark majority opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s initial judgment with respect to 
the constitutionality of VMI’s exclusionary program, 197  and reversed the 
Fourth Circuit’s final judgment with respect to the constitutionality of the 
Commonwealth’s proposed remedy. 198  First, in responding to the 
Commonwealth’s sex-related justificat
erently unsuitable to women” 199  because of alleged gender-bas
siological, psychological, and social differences between the sex
ice Ginsburg stated the following:  
Supposed “inherent differences” are no longer accepted as a ground for race 
or national origin classifications. Physical differences between men and 
193 United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 892 (4th Cir. 1992). 
194 Id. at 900.  
195 United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1241 (4th Cir. 1995) (concluding that 
the creation of a separate public school for women is constitutional, assuming that “[t]he 
opportunities that would be open both to men and women are sufficiently comparable”). 
196 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 530–31 (1996). 
197 Id. at 546 (“Virginia, in sum, has fallen far short of establishing the exceedingly 
persuasive justification that must be the solid base for any gender-defined 
classification.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
198 Id. at 555–56 (“In sum, Virginia’s remedy does not match the constitutional 
violation; the Commonwealth has shown no ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for 
withholding from women qualified for the experience premier training of the kind VMI 
affords.”). 
199 Id. at 541. 
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ations may be used to compensate women “for 
particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered,” to “promot[e] equal 
objectionable; Justice Breyer in particular remarked that when he was that 
age “people did sometimes stick things in my underwear” in the locker 
     
women, however, are enduring: “[T]he two sexes are not fungible; a 
community made up exclusively of one [sex] is different from a community 
composed of both.” 
“Inherent differences” between men and women, we have come to 
appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the 
members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s 
opportunity. Sex classific
employment opportunity,” to advance full development of the talent and 
capacities of our Nation’s people. But such classifications may not be used, 
as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic 
inferiority of women.200  
Conceding that women and men might be different in all sorts of 
biological, social, and cultural ways, Justice Ginsburg nevertheless made 
clear that such differences could not function as a liability nor as a reason to 
deny members of either sex equal opportunity. While differences—or, at 
least, “physical” or biological differences—might flow from nature, 
constraints on individual opportunity that are predicated on those differences 
have the character of artifice, as those constraints are, in her words, 
“artificial,” and therefore unlike the physical/biological differences that give 
rise to them. 
Justice Ginsburg’s statements in Virginia regarding the reality of gender 
difference anticipate some of her more recent observations on that subject, 
observations that suggest that the author of Virginia’s majority opinion 
understands gender difference to encompass more than just 
physical/biological difference. For instance, her remarks regarding the 
reactions of her eight male colleagues to a case recently decided by the Court 
that involved a public school’s strip search of a thirteen-year-old girl, Safford 
Unified School District v. Redding,201 indicate that she believes that men and 
women (or at least male and female jurists) have unique interpretive 
perspectives because of their sex and the individual experiences that flow 
from it. During oral argument in Safford, the male justices could not 
understand why the strip search of a young female teenager was so 
                                                                                              
200 Id. at 533–34 (internal citations omitted). 
201 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2644 (2009) 
(holding, in part, that a public school’s strip search of a thirteen-year-old girl who was 
susp
the United States Constitution). 
ected of distributing contraband drugs was unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment of 
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ey have never been a 13-year-old girl. It’s a very 
sens
     
room.202 In an interview with Joan Biskupic of USA Today, Justice Ginsburg 
later commented: “Th
itive age for a girl . . . . I didn’t think that my colleagues, some of them, 
quite understood.”203 
During that same interview, Justice Ginsburg also told Biskupic that in 
two recent employment discrimination cases in which she dissented and 
which ruled against female claimants alleging a compensation-related Title 
VII violation, AT&T v. Hulteen204 and Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co.,205 her male colleagues showed “a certain lack of understanding”206 of 
the kind of bias that women face in the workplace. In addition, she suggested 
that the current gender imbalance on the Court has real consequences. Not 
only are “there . . . perceptions that [female justices] have because we are 
women,”207 she explained, but female justices “can be sensitive to things that 
are said in draft opinions that (male justices) are not aware can be 
offensive.” 208  These sex-based differences, she continued, are even 
“sometimes in the outcome” of a decision.209 In a more recent interview for 
The New York Times Magazine, Justice Ginsburg remarked that “women 
                                                                                              
202 Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, Safford, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (No. 08-479), 2009 
WL 1064200.  
203 Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: The Court Needs Another Woman, USA TODAY, May 
6, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2009-05-05-
ruthginsburg_N.htm; see also Neil A. Lewis, Debate On Whether Female Judges Decide 
Differently Arises Anew, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2009, at A16 (summarizing these 
comments). 
204 AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962, 1966 (2009) (holding that an employer 
does not violate the Pregnancy Discrimination Act when it calculates female employees’ 
pension benefits under an accrual rule that was in effect before that Act and that gave less 
retirement credit for pregnancy leave than for medical leave generally). 
205 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007) (holding 
that a female employee’s sex-related pay discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 was time barred under that Act, which requires plaintiffs alleging pay 
discrimination to file a claim with the EEOC not later than 180 days after the first 
instance of the alleged pay discrimination), superseded by statute, The Lilly Ledbetter 
Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 12
0e-5(e)) (providing that “an u
3 Stat. 5, 5–6 (2009) (amending 42 USC 
§ 200 nlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to 
disc n in compensation[,] . . . each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is 
paid
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brin
dging, cases, both the content and the 
con
g a different life experience to the table,”210 even as she disagreed (in 
that same interview) with the notion that female judges will arrive at a certain 
conclusion simply because “that’s the way women are.”211 
Justice Ginsburg’s recent remarks to the media suggest that she 
understands “‘inherent differences’ between men and women” to capture far 
more than just physical difference alone. Of course, that Justice Ginsburg 
was focused on physical differences between the sexes in her Virginia 
opinion is a plausible interpretation given that it explicitly, and exclusively, 
highlights gender differences of the “physical” variety.212 At the same time, 
however, in Virginia Justice Ginsburg also cites to Ballard v. United 
States,213 a case that addressed not physical differences between the sexes, 
but rather perspectival differences between them, for what was at issue there 
were jury qualifications and whether a jury of both sexes was different from 
a jury of just one sex. In observing that “a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if 
either sex is excluded” from a jury, the Ballard Court very much answered 
that latter question in the affirmative. 214  Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg’s 
inherent differences passage, as noted above, was responding to the 
Commonwealth’s claim that physical as well as 
psychological/social/emotional differences between the sexes justified the 
exclusion of women from VMI.215 Thus, coupled with Justice Ginsburg’s 
recent statements regarding the important role that gender can play in 
understanding, and perhaps even in ju
text of Virginia’s inherent differences passage suggest that its author 
understands gender difference to encompass something more than just 
physical/biological distinctions alone. 
Second, in responding to the United States’ claim that Virginia’s 
proposed remedy failed to satisfy the constitutional requirements of equal 
protection, Justice Ginsburg and a majority of the Court agreed. The 
proposed remedy was unconstitutional because the ostensibly “parallel” 
                                                                                                   
210 Emily Bazelon, The Place of Women on the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2009, 
(Magazine), at 24. 
.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“Physical differences 
betw
alifornia, where women were eligible for jury 
serv
 of the community than would be true if an economic or racial group were 
excl
anying text. 
211 Id. at 25. 
212 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U
een men and women . . . are enduring.”). 
213  Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195–96 (1946) (holding that the 
deliberate exclusion of women from the panel from which petit and grand juries were 
drawn in a case tried in federal court in C
ice, required dismissal of indictment). 
214  Id. at 194 (“The exclusion of one [sex] may indeed make the jury less 
representative
uded.”).  
215 See supra note 197 and accomp
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alf of these women that the United States has instituted this suit, and 
it is 
ude that this facial 
cha
                                                                                                   
institution was patently unequal, lacking not only the tangible resources, but 
also the prestige and the unique experience that VMI offered.216 In addition, 
the majority found that to refuse to provide women with the same experience 
that the male VMI cadets received would be to perpetuate “generalizations” 
and stereotypes about the proper roles of men and women in society.217  
Finally, while recognizing that VMI would have to make minimal 
adjustments if forced to integrate, particularly with respect to living 
arrangements, Justice Ginsburg also reasoned that if even just some women 
could satisfy the physical, psychological, and emotional rigors of the 
adversative method, then that was enough to find that the Commonwealth’s 
remedy was not a constitutional one.218 In the majority opinion’s words: “It 
is on beh
for them that a remedy must be crafted.”219 Inherent differences between 
the sexes, in other words, did not really matter if at least some women could 
attend VMI without fundamentally altering what made that institution 
special. 
It is worth noting that this idea that constitutional guarantees of equal 
protection are designed to protect the unique or exceptional case—i.e., those 
women who can satisfy the demands of VMI’s adversative method—is 
something that Justice Ginsburg would return to in Gonzales v. Carhart220 
(and also something with which Justice Scalia strongly disagrees in his 
Virginia dissent 221 ). In Carhart, as is well known, Justice Ginsburg 
vehemently dissented from the Court’s decision to uphold the 
constitutionality of the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003. In 
responding to the majority’s contention that the Act survived a facial 
constitutional challenge because respondents failed to show that the ban 
would be unconstitutional “in a large fraction of relevant cases,”222 Justice 
Ginsburg noted that “[i]t makes no sense to concl
llenge fails because respondents have not shown that a health exception is 
necessary for a large fraction of second-trimester abortions, including those 
8 U.S. at 551–54. 
t 550. 
g the constitutionality 
of th
preme Court of the 
Unit unique’ dispositions.”). 
216 Virginia, 51
217 Id. a
218 Id.  
219 Id. (emphasis added). 
220 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 147 (2007) (upholdin
e federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 on its face).  
221 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Su
ed States does not sit to announce ‘
222 Carhart, 550 U.S. at 167–68. 
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the inherent differences between men and women—or, in his memorable 
 of 
woman.”225 That Mrs. Bradwell, a married woman, wanted to deviate from 
the 
men and women” exist and that “these differences are to 
be ‘
“Significantly,” Sunstein observes, this conception of gender equality 
“avoids a claim that women are not biologically or socially different from 
men differences justify unequal 
treat
for which a health exception is unnecessary: The very purpose of a health 
exception is to protect women in exceptional cases.”223  
As in Virginia, so too in Carhart does Justice Ginsburg articulate a 
vision of law that protects—and perhaps especially protects—the exceptional 
case. In so doing, she nicely responds to a concurring opinion from the first 
sex discrimination case ever considered by the Supreme Court, Bradwell v. 
Illinois.224 There, in agreeing with the Court to uphold the Illinois Supreme 
Court’s refusal to grant a married woman’s application to practice law in that 
state, Justice Bradley reasoned that the denial was constitutional in light of
locution, “in view of the peculiar characteristics, destiny, and mission
so-called norms of her sex by practicing law was of no moment. “[T]he 
rules of civil society,” Justice Bradwell observed, “must be adapted to the 
general constitution of things and cannot be based on exceptional cases.”226  
B. Virginia’s Vision of Difference: “Ambitious” and “Distinctive” 
As mentioned earlier, Sunstein has commented that Virginia is “an 
ambitious opinion” that “offers a distinctive understanding of sex 
equality.”227 “The depth of the Court’s opinion in United States v. Virginia,” 
he writes, “can be found in the Court’s understanding of the principle of 
gender equality.” In recognizing both that inherent “biological and social 
differences between 
celebrate[d,]’ not turned into a source of inequality,” Justice Ginsburg’s 
majority opinion advances an ambitious conception of gender equality. 
. It also avoids a claim that those 
ment.”228 
                                                                                                   
223 Id. at 188–89 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
224 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 137 (1872). 
225 Id. at 142 (Bradley, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  
226 Id. at 141–42 (emphasis added); see also id. at 141 (“It is true that many women 
are unmarried and not affected by any of the duties, complications, and incapacities 
arising out of the married state, but these are exceptions to the general rule.”) (emphasis 
added). 
227 Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 9, at 74; see also SUNSTEIN, 
ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 165 (noting that the Virginia “Court offered a 
particular understanding of sex equality”). 
228 Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 9, at 76–77; see also SUNSTEIN, 
ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 169 (“The [Virginia] Court emphasizes that there 
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ender difference or relied on it too much in 
orde
e ground that reproductive differences—the fact that only women 
cou
nlike Reed, and like Michael M., 
To be sure, Justice Ginsburg’s reckoning with difference in Virginia is 
“distinctive” and “particular” because it departs in intriguing ways from 
Supreme Court precedent on the legal significance of sex/gender difference 
as well as from some of the dominant feminist critiques of the law’s 
approach to sex/gender difference. First, it departs from Supreme Court 
precedent on the legal significance of sex/gender difference because it 
recognizes not only that sex/gender differences exist, but also that such 
differences cannot be turned into a disadvantage nor relied upon to 
perpetuate stereotypical ways of thinking about the relative positions of men 
and women in public life. Unlike Virginia, as well as Justice Ginsburg’s 
more recent pronouncements regarding gender difference, prior sex equality 
cases either did not recognize g
r to justify unequal treatment—unequal treatment that, in turn, 
perpetuated gender stereotypes. 
In Reed v. Reed, for instance, the Supreme Court struck down a sex-
based estate administration classification on the ground that it was irrational 
to assume that women were different from men when it came to 
administering estates.229 Insofar as the Reed decision “rejected as ‘irrational’ 
the view that women might be different from men with respect to their ability 
to handle the traditionally ‘male’ responsibilities of estate administration,”230 
it has been characterized by some commentators as “profoundly 
assimilationist,” 231  embracing as it did a no-differences model and its 
assimilative ideal. Alternatively, in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma 
County, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a sex-specific statutory rape 
law on th
ld become pregnant—justified the law’s differential treatment of the 
sexes.232 
Whereas the Reed decision flatly rejected the possibility of difference, 
the Michael M. decision arguably could not take its eyes off of it. The 
Virginia decision departs from both. U
                                                                                                   
are indeed differences between men and women, some of them biological, some of them 
social. Its claim is that differences are to be ‘celebrated,’ and not turned into a source of 
inequality. Thus the opinion suggests that the problem of sex equality is a problem of 
second-class citizenship, in which women’s differences from men are used, by the state, 
as a reason for prescribing gender roles in a way that deprives women of equal 
opportunity.”). 
229 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971).  
230 Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 
1304–05 (1987).  
231 Id. at 1304. 
232 Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 472–73 (1981).  
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r even that they should,” and 
mai
 that are the same can ever be equal.”235 
also partakes of a symmetrical equality model. That model, Littleton 
explains, “attempt[s] to equate legal treatment of sex with that of race and 
deny ny significant natural differences between women 
and  the two sexes symmetrically located 
                   
Virginia recognizes that differences exist. Like Reed, and unlike Michael M., 
Virginia demands equality of treatment. 
Second, Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Virginia departs from 
some of the dominant feminist critiques of the law’s approach to sex/gender 
difference because it offers a kind of third alternative to feminism’s two 
dominant sex equality models, even as it partakes of both. In one sense, the 
opinion partakes of an asymmetrical equality model. The asymmetrical 
equality model, Professor Christine Littleton explains, “rejects the notion that 
all gender differences are likely to disappear, o
ntains that the law should attempt to deal with those differences, or at 
least some of them, in some way.233 Whatever “way” that might be depends 
on which variety of asymmetrical equality one adopts. While some 
asymmetrical equality model proponents support special rights/special 
treatment, others support accommodation and acceptance. 234  Of primary 
importance here, however, is the fact that the asymmetrical equal model 
recognizes the reality of gender difference and rejects a definition of sex 
equality that relies on “a ‘mathematical fallacy’—that is, the view that only 
things
Insofar as Justice Ginsburg’s Virginia opinion, like her more public 
remarks, embraces gender difference (biological and social alike), it would 
not be wrong to say that it exhibits features of the asymmetrical equality 
model (at least with respect to its understanding of difference). Indeed, it is 
asymmetrical in the sense that it not only acknowledges gender difference, 
but “celebrates” it.236 In this sense, the opinion represents a strong version of 
asymmetrical equality, as some proponents of that model would only go so 
far as to say that the law should tolerate difference, not necessarily celebrate 
it.237 
In another sense, however, Justice Ginsburg’s Virginia majority opinion 
 that there are in fact a
 men; in other words, to consider
                                                                                
,’ 
‘acc
8 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“‘Inherent differences’ 
betw
 any sexually equal society must somehow deal with 
diffe
233 Littleton, supra note 230, at 1292.  
234  Id. at 1295 (“Asymmetrical approaches include ‘special rights
ommodation,’ ‘acceptance,’ and ‘empowerment.’”). 
235 Id. at 1282. 
236 See United States v. Virginia, 51
een men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration.”). 
237 Littleton, supra note 230, at 1295 (observing that “[a]symmetrical approaches to 
sexual equality . . . argue that
rence, problematic as that may be”). 
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n as the same in 
                                                                                                   
with regard to any issue, norm or rule.”238 Under the symmetrical equality 
model, sex-based differences are minimized, if not denied altog
us instead is on assimilation, which itself “is based on the notion that 
women, given the chance, really are or could be just like men.”239 Under this 
view, Littleton explains, “the law should require social institutions to treat 
women as they already treat men—requiring, for example, that the 
professions admit women to the extent they are ‘qualified.’”240 
Insofar as Justice Ginsburg’s Virginia opinion makes clear that women 
must be treated in nearly all ways just like men when it comes to being a 
student at VMI, it would not be wrong to say that it exhibits features of the 
symmetrical equality model. To be sure, the opinion approximates 
symmetrical equality not because it minimizes sex-based differences—quite 
the contrary. Rather, it approximates the symmetrical equality model because 
it maintains that the Commonwealth must treat eligible females and eligible 
males the same, notwithstanding their inherent differences, because at least 
some women can satisfy the rigorous demands of the adversative method.241 
While the majority opinion recognizes that VMI might have to ch
e ways were it to integrate,242 it places most of its emphasis on the fact 
that at least some women will be able to satisfy VMI’s physical, 
psychological, and emotional rigors. As with proponents of symmetrical 
equality, then, Justice Ginsburg believes that VMI must integrate precisely 
because at least some of the women who apply there are “qualified.” 
The point here, however, is that while Justice Ginsburg’s Virginia 
opinion partakes of both equality models, it fully mirrors neither. Unlike the 
asymmetrical equality model, Virginia’s vision of sex equality does not 
require that institutions—there, VMI—really change all that much (and 
sacrifice what renders them unique) in order to accommodate inherent 
difference. Unlike the symmetrical equality model, Virginia’s vision of sex 
equality does not require that the law view men and wome
238 Id. at 1291. For a notable example of this approach, see Wendy W. Williams, 
The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 WOMEN’S 
RTS. L. REP. 175, 196 (1982). 
eton, supra note 230, at 1292. 
r 
cour




241 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542 (“The issue . . . is not whether ‘women—or men—
should be forced to attend VMI’; rather, the question is whether the Commonwealth can 
constitutionally deny to women who have the will and capacity, the training and attendant 
opportunities that VMI uniquely affords.”); see also id. at 550 (agreeing with the lowe
t that “some women . . . do well under [the] adversative model”) (citation omitted). 
242 See id. at 550 n.19 (“Admitting women to VMI would undoubtedly require 
alterations necessary to afford members of each sex privacy from the o
gements, and to adjust aspects of the physical training program.”).
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wha ginia’s vision of sex equality a unique one as far as the 
Supreme Court’s sex jurisprudence goes, it “avoids a claim that women are 
not 
separate legal status for same-sex couples, such as civil union or domestic 
partnership recognition, does not cure the constitutional violation of 
withholding marriage from those couples in the first place. Just as Virginia 
                                                                                                   
order to be treated equally. To return to Sunstein’s careful assessment of 
t makes Vir
biologically or socially different from men” and at the same time “avoids 
a claim that those differences justify unequal treatment.”243 
C. The Role of Virginia’s Vision of Difference in Marriage Equality 
Litigation 
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in United States v. Virginia has 
played a noticeably thin role in pro-marriage equality briefs and decisions. 
With few notable exceptions, briefs filed by advocates for the same-sex 
couple plaintiffs in marriage equality litigation have largely neglected to cite 
to the Court’s “inherent differences” passage.244 Moreover, that passage has 
not appeared in any of the four state supreme court decisions that have held 
that limiting the definition of marriage to cross-sex couples violates state 
constitutional equality and/or due process guarantees.245 To the extent that 
pro-marriage equality briefs or pro-marriage equality decisions advert to 
Virginia, they do so instead to support the proposition that the creation of a 
243 Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 9, at 76–77. 
244 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae OneIowa et al. at 24–25, Varnum v. Brien, 763 
N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (No. 07-1499); Brief of Respondents at 43, Andersen v. King 
County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (No. 75934-1). The conclusion of OneIowa’s brief is 
worth quoting in full: 
As the Supreme Court has written in explaining its rejection of most sex-based 
classifications, there remain differences between the sexes, and the “‘[i]nherent 
differences’ between men and women . . . remain cause for celebration, . . . not for 
denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an 
individual’s opportunity.” So it is with sexual orientation. Just as we celebrate the 
differences between the genders, so we can recognize and celebrate the different 
experiences that same-sex and opposite-sex relationships contribute to the complex 
tapestry of our community. It is time to put behind us the condemnation that has 
transformed “difference” into “discrimination” and excluded gay men and lesbians 
from the principles of equal citizenship, fairness and dignity that are their shared 
birthright.  
Brief of Amici Curiae OneIowa, supra, at 24–25 (citation omitted). 
245 See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); In re Marriage Cases, 183 
P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. 
Horton, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591 (Sup. Ct. 2009); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 
A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 
2003). 
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parate (and inferior) institution 
for 
r Douglas Kmiec, who has 
recently called attention to the fact that even Justice Ginsburg, a champion of 
gen ly 
exis
rg fairly rejects 
the same-sex claim that “the modern individuation of women has resulted in 
found that the Commonwealth could not cure the constitutional violation that 
the Court found in that case by creating a se
women, they argue, neither can the state cure the constitutional violation 
of restricting marriage to cross-sex couples by creating a separate (and 
inferior) institution for same-sex couples.246 
While scarce in pro-marriage equality arguments, Virginia’s vision of 
“inherent differences” has played an active role in arguments deployed by 
those who oppose marriage equality. For instance, marriage opponents have 
variously argued to courts that it is not irrational for the state to promote 
dual-gender marriage and to discourage same-sex marriage because, as 
“Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has pointed out, the ‘two sexes 
are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one [sex] is different 
from a community composed of both.’”247 In the words of one amicus brief 
filed in Washington’s marriage equality case, “[p]laintiffs wish to live in a 
world with no gender differences,” when in fact even the Supreme Court has 
stated that “inherent differences” between the sexes not only exist, but are 
“enduring.”248 Or, in the words of another friend of court brief that was filed 
in Maryland’s marriage equality case, it is important to “[a]ppreciat[e] the 
innate differences between men and women and the unique contributions 
each sex makes in child-rearing” because “[a]s Supreme Court Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg has pointed out, . . . ‘[i]nherent differences between men and 
women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration.’” 249  
These briefs almost uniformly cite to Professo
der equality, has acknowledged that inherent gender difference not on
ts but should be “celebrated.” In his words: 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has been a thoughtful advocate for gender 
equality throughout her career, yet, she has written for the Court that the 
genders are simply not identical . . . In this, Justice Ginsbu
                                                                                                   
246 See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary 
Judg
American Center for Law & Justice in Support of 
Resp iage 
Case
an Center for Law & Justice, Northeast, Inc., as Amicus 
Curi
ment at 48, Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (No. NNH-CV 04-
4001813). 
247 Brief Amicus Curiae of The 
ondent Proposition 22 Legal Defense And Education Fund at 12–13, Marr
s, 183 P.3d 384 (No. S147999).  
248 Intervenor’s Reply Brief at 18–19, Andersen, 138 P.3d 963 (No. 75934-1).  
249 Brief of the Americ
ae in Support of Defendant-Appellant at 16, Deane v. Conaway, No. 2499 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. June 22, 2006).  
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the kind of fluidity of gender roles for men and women” that makes the 
presence of both genders within a family unnecessary.250 
That marriage progressives would deliberately avoid citing to Justice 
Ginsburg’s inherent differences passage—or to any of her recent 
pronouncements on the reality and significance of gender on the Supreme 
Court—makes sense on a number of levels. First, the passage disrupts the 
like-straight reasoning/no-differences model on which marriage equality 
arguments have largely rested. Indeed, there would seem to be little, if any, 
room for the acknowle
erence or sexual orientation difference, in a world dominated by the 
“‘mathematical fallacy’—that is, the view that only things that are the same 
can ever be equal.”251  
Second, under one view at least (although not one with which this Essay 
agrees), the inherent differences passage suggests that the High Court of the 
Nation views same-sex relationships not only as different from their cross-
sex counterparts, but also as less desirable than them. Indeed, by suggesting 
that differences should be a cause for celebration rather than for the 
denigration of either sex, and by citing to a case, Ballard v. United States, 
which observes that “a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is 
excluded” from democratic institutions like the jury,252 Virginia might be 
read to indicate that VMI would gain something by integrating and by 
becoming a dual-sex institution (and, by extension, that marriage would lose 
something by becoming a single-sex community). That being the case, gay 
advocates might believe that by citing to Virginia’s in
uage, they are implicitly suggesting that same-sex marriage lacks the 
“flavor” and “distinct quality” that all institutions—including, of course, 
marriage—enjoy by virtue of having both sexes in them.  
Third and last, the inherent differences passage is susceptible to the same 
sort of interpretation to which it was put by a majority of the Court in 
Nguyen v. INS.253 There, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal 
immigration law that made it more difficult for a non-marital child born 
abroad to one parent who was a United States citizen to claim citizenship 
through that parent if it was the father rather than the mother. 254  The 
                                                                                                   
250  Douglas W. Kmiec, The Procreative Argument for Proscribing Same-Sex 
Marriage, 32 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 653, 656 n.6 (2005) (quoting Maura I. Strassberg, 
Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy, and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 
N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1606 (1997)).  
251 Littleton, supra note 230, at 1282.  
252 Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 194 (1946). 
253 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 68 (2001).  
254 Id. at 58–59. 
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recognize what the Nguyen dissent—authored by Justice O’Connor and 
                                                                                                   
government argued, in part, that the law was constitutional because it 
advanced the government’s interest in ensuring that the non-marital child and 
the citizen parent “have some demonstrated opportunity or potential to 
develop not just a relationship that is recognized, as a formal matter, by the 
law, but one that consists of the real, everyday ties that provide a connection 
between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States.”255 Unwed 
citizen mothers, unlike unwed citizen fathers, automatically established that 
relationship du
ernment’s view, that a law that placed additional burdens on unwed 
citizen fathers when naturalizing their biological children born overseas 
passed constitutional muster, as such a law did nothing more than reflect the 
biological/reproductive advantages that women already had over men to 
begin with.257 
A majority of the Court agreed and upheld the law. Writing for the 
majority, Justice Kennedy reasoned that “[t]here is nothing irrational or 
improper in the recognition that at the moment of birth . . . the mother’s 
knowledge of the child and the fact of parenthood have been established in a 
way not guaranteed in the case of the unwed father.”258 Moreover, citing 
United States v. Virginia’s acknowledgement that “[p]hysical differences 
between men and women . . . are enduring,” Justice Kennedy flatly stat
is is not a stereotype.” 259  Notwithstanding the dissenting Justices’ 
observation that the law rested on “impermissible stereotypes” of the sort that 
the Court’s prior sex equality jurisprudence had solidly rejected, 260  the 
majority, perhaps again thinking of Virginia, concluded that “[t]he difference 
between men and women in relation to the birth process is a real one.”261 
In light of Nguyen’s reliance on Virginia in support of the proposition 
that inherent biological difference justifies differential legal treatment of the 
sexes, it makes sense that gay advocates might want to shy away from 
Virginia’s vision of difference in marriage equality briefs, intent as those 
briefs are on leveling any difference whatsoever between an intimate 
community of two sexes (cross-sex marriage) and an intimate community of 
one sex (same-sex marriage). To be sure, the Nguyen majority failed to 
5.  
4–65. 
, 533 U.S. at 68 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 
(199
ssenting). 
255 Id. at 64–6
256 Id. at 65. 
257 See id. at 6
258 Id. at 68. 
259 Nguyen
6)). 
260 Id. at 79, 89 (O’Connor, J., di
261 Id. at 73 (majority opinion). 
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t does not 
violate constitutional equality guarantees when it classifies on the basis of 
to call attention to the sorts of differences surveyed in Part III and to the part 
of Virginia that highlights inherent differences between the sexes. 
rriage laws violate constitutional equality guarantees. 
Wh
                                                                                                   
joined by Justice Ginsburg—made perfectly clear: that “overbroad sex-based 
generalizations are impermissible even when they enjoy empirical 
support,”262 that is, even when it appears that “real” biological differences 
have “real” effects. (It also failed, for that matter, to recognize what Virginia 
made perfectly clear, namely, that even “real” difference is never good 
enough of a reason to justify unequal treatment that denies equal 
opportunity.) Nevertheless, given that a majority of the Supreme Court itself 
has invoked Virginia in support of the idea that the governmen
“real” difference, it is understandable that gay advocates might be reluctant 
D. Incorporating Virginia’s Vision of Difference into Pro-Marriage 
Equality Arguments 
As with the empirical studies surveyed in Part III, however, just because 
pro-marriage equality advocates have not used Virginia’s vision of difference 
in marriage equality litigation does not mean that they could not—or, as Part 
V will argue, that they should not. Apart from a more normative 
consideration of why it makes sense for gay advocates to turn to Justice 
Ginsburg’s (and Virginia’s) vision of difference in that litigation, which the 
next Part will undertake, there are more than a few reasons why that vision is 
not incompatible, and is even compatible, with the argument that 
exclusionary ma
ereas some of those reasons relate to what Virginia actually said with 
respect to the role that sex difference should or should not play in public life, 
others relate to what Virginia can be said to stand for in a larger, more 
symbolic sense. 
First, and more narrowly, Virginia never said that inherent biological or 
social differences between the sexes justify unequal treatment by the state—
indeed, quite the contrary. As discussed earlier, marriage equality opponents 
have cited to Virginia in support of the proposition that exclusionary 
marriage laws are constitutional because they rest on the legitimate state 
interest of privileging gender difference over gender similarity, something 
which Virginia indicated was not only “[i]nherent,” but also worthy of 
“celebration.” 263  What those oppositional arguments fail to recognize, 
however, is that Virginia also stands for the proposition that inherent 
difference, while something that both exists and is worthy of celebration, 
cannot be relied upon by the state to perpetuate stereotypes about the sexes’ 
 
ed States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
262 Id. at 76 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
263 Unit
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ot justify governmental treatment that denies 
equ
ourt found in that case—the creation of an 
all-
-sex and cross-sex couples exist 
                                                                                                   
relative positions in public life or “for denigration of the members of either 
sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity.”264 Inherent 
difference, in other words, cann
al opportunity. To the extent that cross-sex marriage restrictions deny 
equal opportunity because of sex and sex stereotypes, which they 
undoubtedly do, they constitute just the sort of governmental action that 
Virginia explicitly denounces. 
In addition, and again, contrary to oppositional marriage arguments that 
rely on Virginia to suggest otherwise, Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion 
never once indicates that mixed-sex institutions—VMI, the jury, or 
marriage—are superior to those of the single-sex variety. Rather, citing 
Ballard, her opinion simply states that “a community made up exclusively of 
one [sex] is different from a community composed of both,” 265  not 
necessarily better than it. Indeed, part of what made Justice Ginsburg’s 
majority opinion in Virginia an “ambitious” one, according to Sunstein, was 
that she left open the possibility that an all-female educational environment 
would not violate constitutional equality guarantees, as long as it was truly 
equal in all tangible and intangible respects to its all-male educational 
counterpart. 266  The problem with Virginia’s proposed remedy to the 
constitutional violation that the C
female public institution in Virginia—was that it was not equal in any 
respect to VMI. If it had been, the author of Virginia’s majority opinion 
suggests, then the Court might have ruled otherwise with respect to the 
remedial portion of its opinion.  
This is all just to say that Virginia has been misinterpreted by marriage 
equality opponents to say something that it does not say and that supposedly 
renders it incompatible with any sort of pro-marriage equality argument that 
recognizes difference. Indeed, if anything, Virginia’s recognition of the 
differences between same-sex and mixed-sex communities is quite 
compatible with some of the findings of social scientists with respect to the 
differences that exist between same-sex and cross-sex relationships—
differences, these scientists speculate, that flow at least as much (if not more) 
from the same-sex nature of a same-sex relationship as they do from the 
sexual orientation of its members. Put differently, Virginia’s inherent 
differences passage would only support the empirical data, discussed earlier, 
that indicate that differences between same
264 Id. 
265 Id. (emphasis added).  
266  See Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 9, at 77 (stating that 
Virginia “avoids a claim that equal treatment is necessarily required in all contexts” and 
that “the Court left open the possibility that it would uphold a law that promotes both 
educational diversity and equal opportunity”).  





Moreover, Virginia’s mandate of equal treatment notwithstanding sex 
dif is 
equally accepting of what Professor William Eskridge has referred to as 
“be
reality of that difference into a legal argument exists—namely, the model 
offered by the author of United States v. Virginia’s majority opinion, Justice 
                                                                                                   
ss a number of important domains—including those domains, such as 
parenting and the family, that have figured so heavily in marriage equality 
litigation—in large part because of the single-sex nature of the intimate 
community that is a same-sex relationship.  
Second, and more broadly, it is not just that Virginia is not incompatible 
with a pro-marriage equality position that recognizes the differences between 
same-sex and cross-sex relationships that flow from gender; it is also that it is 
eminently compatible with a vision of equality more generally that 
challenges the mathematical fallacy with respect to equal treatment on the 
basis of sexual choice. As mentioned earlier, marriage equality advocacy 
specifically, and gay rights advocacy more generally, rests on a symmetrical 
model of equality, one that assumes that sameness is a necessary pre-
dition for equal treatment. As far as sex equality is concerned, Justice 
Ginsburg’s Virginia opinion in part disrupts this symmetrical model of 
equality by recognizing that women and men are entitled to equal treatment 
by the state notwithstanding their inherent biological and social differences.  
Although it has not thus far, Virginia might symbolically represent, for 
gay rights advocacy, and perhaps eventually for a gay rights jurisprudence, 
the possibility of recognizing difference, whether inherent or not, along the 
axis of sexuality as well as along the axis of sex. Indeed, Virginia’s implicit 
understanding that “similarly situated” need not mean identical in all respects 
in order to translate into equal treatment by the state might encourage gay 
advocates to advance legal arguments that recognize, and perhaps even 
celebrate, the sort of sexual differences that make sexual minorities, the 
relationships into which they enter, and the families that they rai
ferences might one day translate into a sexuality jurisprudence that 
nign sexual variation”267 as it now is of sex/gender difference. 
V. THE NORMATIVE VALUE OF VIRGINIA’S VISION OF DIFFERENCE 
The objective of this Essay’s previous Parts was to show that the idea of 
same-sex marriage continues to be informed by a no-differences model by 
both the legal community and the public more generally, despite the fact that 
scientists have concluded that differences between same-sex and cross-sex 
relationships exist, and despite the fact that a model for incorporating the 
267  William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion, 
Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 
YALE L.J. 2411, 2412 (1997).  
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Ginsburg, for whom that decision is considered to be one that “she had hoped 
the Court would one day arrive at when she first started arguing cases of 
[sex] discrimination in the 1960s.” 268  Having thus elucidated the no-
differences model, discussed its shortcomings, and offered an alternative 
model that draws force from Justice Ginsburg’s landmark sex equality 
opinion, this Part will now turn to a brief consideration of why gay advocates 
should
retically offers. While those reasons are many, this Part will focus on 
three. 
First, and as discussed earlier, gay advocates should not have to sacrifice 
factual/descriptive accuracy in exchange for equal treatment. As Stacey and 
Biblarz nicely put it, “the case for granting equal rights to nonheterosexual 
parents should not require finding their children to be identical to those 
reared by heterosexuals.”269 The same could be said of the depictions of 
same-sex relationships that emerge from the legal arguments in marriage 
equality litigation, namely, that they should not have to look like a same-sex 
replica of what society imagines a heterosexual relationship to look like. 
Legal equality, in other words, should not demand that advocates under 
represent, if not completely ignore, the differences that actually exist 
between same-sex and cross-sex relationships and between the families of 
gays and those of straights. To the extent that the author of Virginia’s 
majority opinion embraces sex equality in the face of sex difference both in 
that opinion and outside of it, she offers the possibility for gay advocates to 
argue that courts considering the equality claims of sexual minorities, 
whether in the marriage context or otherwise, should do the same. Moreover, 
to the extent that commentators and marriage equality advocates alike are 
interested in making “claims that are not only useful but truthful,” 270  it 
would seem that Virginia offers them a strong possib
criptive/factual arguments that are both accurate and have robust 
antecedents in the Supreme Court’s equality jurisprudence. 
Second, recognizing the differences, inherent or not, between same-sex 
and cross-sex relationships and between the families of gays and those of 
straights in marriage equality litigation promotes something that the no-
differences model woefully fails to: an ethic of cultural pluralism, diversity, 
and “benign” heterogeneity.271 Insofar as our society values diversity in its 
manifold forms—including racial, religious, sex/gender, and sexuality 
diversity—we should not hesitate to demand that our legal system do the 
268 SALOMONE, supra note 10, at 165 (remarks of Mark Tushnet, then Dean of the 
Georgetown University Law Center). 
269 Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 116, at 178. 
270 Rosky, supra note 176, at 348. 
271 Eskridge, supra note 267, at 2412. 
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, in the process, to offer the law “a more genuinely 
plu
                                                                                                   
same. Effectively forcing marriage equality litigants to succumb to the 
mathematical fallacy in order to secure equal treatment by the state sends the 
message that the law values assimilation over difference and homogeneity 
over heterogeneity when it comes to the equality claims of sexual minorities, 
where it might be much more tolerant of such difference and heterogeneity in 
other areas (e.g., religion, gender). To the extent that Justice Ginsburg’s 
Virginia opinion in part disrupts the symmetrical equality model and the 
mathematical fallacy on which it rests vis-à-vis sex equality, it offers the 
possibility for gay advocates and courts alike to make and to embrace 
arguments that similarly disrupt the symmetrical equality model vis-à-vis 
sexual equality, and
ralist approach to family diversity”272 than the current marriage equality 
strategies allow for. 
Third and last, acknowledging the differences between same-sex and 
cross-sex relationships and between the families of gays and those of 
straights in marriage/sexual equality litigation could result in an image of 
marriage that is more appealing to those progressives who have faulted the 
marriage equality movement for being decidedly conservative and 
unapologetically “imitative” of heterosexual norms and practices.273 Indeed, 
progressive commentators have long criticized the marriage movement for 
projecting an image of marriage that “replicates the heterosexual one, rather 
than challenging or altering it,” 274  and for failing to “validate the 
differentness of lesbians and gay men.”275 Perhaps most notable among them 
is Michael Warner, who has excoriated the movement for its “rhetoric of 
normalization,”276 its “mainstreaming project,”277 and its tendency to lapse 
into “regressive narratives of progress”278—all of which are vividly captured 
in the “regressive” photography that accompanied Denizet-Lewis’s New York 
Times Magazine feature, predicated as it was on visual like-straight reasoning 
and its no-differences logic. Interestingly, the progressive claim that the 
272 Stacey and Biblarz, supra note 116, at 164. 
273 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
274 Walters, supra note 25, at 54. 
275 Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & 
SEXUALITY 9, 12 n.9 (1991) (discussing Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Was Marriage a 
Path To Liberation?, 6 OUT/LOOK, NAT’L LESBIAN & GAY Q. 8 (1989)). Hunter rightly 
observes that as of 1991 “[a]nalogous tensions between equality-based strategies and 
difference-based strategies have buffeted feminist theory for the last decade.” Hunter, 
supra, at 12. 
276  MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE 
ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 60 (1999). 
277 Id. at 146. 
278 Id. at 134. 
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 as justified by the view that a parent’s sexual 
orientation has no impact on, and thus poses no danger to, the sexual 
ment, but also fails to change the social meaning of marriage, 
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movement for same-sex marriage merely mimics a heterosexual paradigm 
echoes the radical feminist claim, made not too long 
ement predicated on a symmetrical equality model merely creates an 
undesirable situation where “women ape men.”279 
That both legal and visual discourse about same-sex marriage has had the 
power to produce an image of that relationship that is profoundly 
heterosexual and profoundly regressive is something that this Essay has 
explored in relative depth. In addition, that the legal arguments that 
advocates deploy can have as profound an impact on the law as do th
idated nearly twenty years ago, when she elegantly observed that: 
The impact of law often lies as much in the body of discourse created in the 
process of its adoption as in the final legal rule itself. What a new legal rule 
is popularly understood to signify may dtermine [sic] more of its potential 
for social change than the particulars of the change in the law. The social 
meaning of the legalization of lesbian and gay marriage, for example, would 
be enormously different if legalization resulted from political efforts framed 
as ending gendered roles between spouses rather than if it were the outcome 
of a campaign valorizing the institution of marriage, even if the ultimate 
“holding” is the same. Similarly, the meaning of securing for lesbians and 
gay men the right to adopt or to raise children is vastly different if 
understood as reflecting the equal worth of lesbian, gay, and heterosexual 
role models, rather than
orientation of a child.280 
In other words, how we frame our legal arguments matters. Framing 
same-sex marriage as but a same-sex version of its cross-sex counterpart not 
only advances a thin vision of cultural pluralism and family diversity and 
alienates those who might otherwise be more sympathetic to the idea of a gay 
marriage move
en if the ultimate ‘holding’”—marriage for gays and straights alike—“is 
the same.”281  
Now, this Essay does not suggest that gay advocates could easily rely on 
Justice Ginsburg’s Virginia opinion in support of the proposition that the law 
should recognize gay marriage because it will transform the institution and 
alter its social, gendered meaning. Indeed, quite the contrary, as Justice 
Ginsburg strongly suggests that admitting women into VMI will not change 
279 GERMAINE GREER, THE FEMALE EUNUCH 353 (1970). 
280 Hunter, supra note 275, at 29. 
281 Id. 
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rences model and its 
assimilative logic has left little, if any, room to have.283 
VI. CONCLUSION 
g marriage to a relationship between “inherently different” women and 
men
words of the one Justice on the Court who has been a “thoughtful advocate 
                                                                                                   
“some women,” despite their inherent differences, can satisfy the physical 
and psychological demands that render VMI special.282 What it does suggest, 
though, is that gay advocates can turn to her landmark sex equality opinion in 
support of the proposition that the law should recognize gay marriage despite 
(or perhaps even because of) its differences. At the very least, Virginia, as 
well as its author’s more recent remarks on the reality of gender difference, 
offer the opportunity of even having a conversation about incorporating the 
idea of difference into the “body of discourse” on which gay advocates could 
and should rely to change legal rules and secure equal treatment, a 
conversation that the sheer pervasiveness of the no-diffe
The objective of this Essay has been to construct an argument why 
United States v. Virginia, an opinion that some consider to be a (if not the) 
highpoint of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s pioneering work on gender 
equality, deserves as revered a place in the law and sexuality canon as it 
currently enjoys in the law and gender canon. More narrowly, and in the 
process of doing just that, this Essay also aimed to challenge the contention 
that Virginia—and, in particular, its famed “inherent differences” passage—
supports exclusionary marriage laws insofar as that passage both recognizes 
and respects the very differences on which those laws ostensibly rest. If even 
the Supreme Court’s champion of gender equality has recognized both that 
inherent differences between the sexes exist and that a community of one sex 
is different from a community of both, or so the traditionalist marriage 
argument goes, then surely it is not irrational for states to do the same by 
limitin
. 
As this Essay has shown, however, that argument seriously misreads 
what Virginia in fact says and stands for: that while gender difference 
(biological, social) might very well exist, difference alone is an insufficient 
reason to deny individuals equal treatment and equal opportunity under the 
law. To the extent that exclusionary marriage laws rest on a justificatory 
logic that is rooted in the idea of gender difference, they deny both equal 
treatment and equal opportunity to those who desire to formalize their 
relationship through marriage. Indeed, it is no doubt perverse to invoke the 
282 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996). 
283  On the assimilative demands that United States equality law places on 
individuals across a range of identity categories, see generally KENJI YOSHINO, 
COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006). 
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for gender equality throughout her career”284 in support of laws that deny 
sexuality equality precisely because of gender difference. 
This Essay draws to a close by citing to one of the amicus briefs filed in 
Iowa’s marriage equality case, Varnum v. Brien, and authored by one of the 
participants in this wonderful symposium, Professor Tobias Wolff. That brief 
cites to Virginia in a way that this author hopes will catch on in the years to 
come, as plaintiffs and their advocates continue to challenge the 
constitutionality of all laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual 
preference, including, but surely not limited to, marriage prohibitions. It 
concludes by reminding the Supreme Court of Iowa that sex-based difference 
is something that the Supreme Court has already embraced in Virginia, thus 
setting a precedent for courts to do the same with respect to sexual 
orientation-based difference. “Just as we celebrate the differences between 
the genders,” the brief observes, “so we can recognize and celebrate the 
different experiences that same-sex and opposite-sex relationships contribute 
to the . . . tapestry of our community.” 85  In her gender equality 
jurisprudence as in her more recent public observations, Justice Ginsburg 
nicely recognizes the ways in which sex-based difference can make a 
difference, “contribut[ing] to the . . . tapestry” 286  of many a community, 
including educational institutions, juries, and the Supreme Court itself. 
Advocates for sexuality equality would do well to follow her lead. 
284 Kmiec, supra note 250, at 656 n.6. 
285 Brief of Amici Curiae OneIowa, supra note 244, at 25. 
286 Id. 
